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Refugees are a flash point for political divisions in the United States and
abroad. The enormous personal, moral, and legal challenges posed by the
displacement of refugees around the world reveal the dire inadequacies of our
current policies toward refugee protection. Children running to border agents
at the U.S. southern border are treated as a security threat to be deterred, instead
of a vulnerable population needing some level of protection. The numbers of
people seeking safety in the United States, while not objectively high, places
further strain on an already under-resourced and heavily burdened immigration
system, which at the end of the day, offers only partial hope to some of those
seeking safety. Simply put, our current laws are simply not designed to offer
meaningful protection that fits the contours of new waves offorced migration.
This Article breaks open a debate that has been caught between the binaries of
protection versus deterrence, and instead asks what framework could effectively
serve multiple goals, both short-term protection and long-term deterrence and
public safety. To do this, it questions our exclusive focus on the protection
afforded by the Refugee Convention, and considers what rights to protection
might be owed to "unconventional refugees."
. Elizabeth Keyes, Associate Professor, Director of the Immigrant Rights Clinic,
University of Baltimore School of Law; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, M.P.A.,
Princeton University; B.A., Carleton College. Professor Keyes has worked on asylum law
and policy within the United States and spent years working overseas in international
development for Catholic Relief Services, the World Bank, and the United Nations
Development Program, and writes this Article from the conviction that responding to
Central American forced migration requires both perspectives in equal measure. I
thank Farrin Anello, Ana Cabot, Stacy Caplow, Michele Gilman, David Jaros, Jennifer
Koh, Matthew Lister, Daniel Melo, Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Jayesh Rathod, Erin Scheick,
Maureen Sweeney, and my colleagues at the University of Baltimore School of Law for
their thoughtful feedback. Any mistakes are my own.
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The Refugee Convention's principle of non-refoulement (or non-return to the
persecuting country) imposes significant duties on receiving nations like the
United States, while its implementation requires intensive individualized
determinations that create great demands on an overstretched immigration system.
Its high value comes from the path it creates for refugees to ultimately access
U.S. citizenship, and the value necessarily entails a process of great detail and
depth. This Article considers whether a complementary form of protection for
unconventional refugees is appropriate--protection that is perhaps less valuable,
but also less complex to administer and easier for the refugees to access.
The Article examines precedents in U.S. immigration laws for such a
reimagined form of protection, and examines a series of justifications, both
philosophical and pragmatic, for such protection. The world is undeniably
experiencing a moment where even the Refugee Convention meets considerable
political opposition, so the project of developing a new framework is a long-term
one, but it is a project that merits thoughtful consideration starting now. The
principle of non-refoulement was once novel, and now constitutes a powerful
principle of international law. A new principle for protecting unconventional
refugees may also be possible, but only if we begin the task of imagining it.
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INTRODUCTION
"We can park our chair on the beach as often as we please, and cfy at the
oncoming waves, but the tide will not listen, nor the sea retreat. "'
The personal, moral, and legal challenges posed by those seeking
refuge in the United States reveal the inadequacies of our current
approach to refugee protection, which largely derives from the 1951
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,2 or the "Refugee
Convention." Current legal and policy responses are not designed to
offer protection that fits the contours of current crises, from Syria to
Central America.' While Europe and the Middle East have most closely
1. ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, STRANGERS AT OUR DOOR 4-5 (2016) (quoting ROBERT
WINDER, BLOODY FOREIGNERS: THE STORY OF IMMIGRATION TO BRITAIN xiii (2013)).
2. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, openedforsignatureJuly 28,1951,
19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter Refugee Convention].
3. See Filippo Grandi, Refugees Deserve Action and Investment, Not Indifference and
Cruelty, WORLD ECON. FORUM (May 24, 2016), https://www.weforum.org/
agenda/ 2016/05 /refugees-deserve-action-and-investment -not-indifference-and-
cruelty (suggesting that migrants are too valuable to society not to protect and that
governments need to do more to offer them protection).
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confronted the needs of Syrian refugees,4 the United States has similar
issues, in smaller scale, connected with the flow of children and
families from violence in Central America.' The Central American
migrants expose both dilemmas and opportunities and call for a
refraining of our ideas of who requires protection-and why and how
they get such protection. This Article terms those needing protection
"unconventional refugees" because their needs fall beyond what the
Refugee Convention itself affords. The Refugee Convention does not
protect many forced migrants from Central America because their
reasons for migrating likely do not fall into a protected category.6
However, this does not mean these migrants do not deserve protection;
this Article simply considers them "unconventional refugees."
This Article is part of an important, longer-term project-nascent
but growing in academic scholarship-of thinking beyond the Refugee
Convention as we look at the humanitarian needs of unconventional
refugees in the twenty-first century.7 Those fleeing Syria and certain
4. See CarolJ. Williams, The Conflicts and Failures Behind the European Migrant Crisis,
L.A. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2015, 10:29 AM), http://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-
european-migrant-crisis-explainer-20150902-story.html (reporting that the Middle
East and Europe have received most of the displaced Syrians).
5. See Adriana Beltran, Children and Families Fleeing Violence in Central America,
WASH. OFFICE ON LATIN AM. (Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.wola.org/analysis/people-
leaving-central-americas-northern-triangle ("Between 2015 and 2016, over 180,000
children and families fleeing violence in Central America were apprehended at the
U.S.-Mexico border.").
6. See infra Section III.C.I. (discussing the protected categories under the
Refugee Convention and how blanket coverage to certain nations failed in the past).
7. This exploration has been most vibrant in the context of "environmental
refugees," a term that itself challenges the technical limitations of the Refugee
Convention, which requires a human persecutor. "While the Refugee Convention may
adequately provide protection for the harms that led individuals to seek refugee status
in the mid-twentieth century, its refugee definition does not recognize modern forms
of harm, such as environmental hazards, that lead many to seek refuge outside the
borders of their home state." BrittanJ. Bush, RedefiningEnvironmental Refugees, 27 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 553, 554 (2013); see also Julia Toscano, Climate Change Displacement and
Forced Migration: An International Crisis, 6 ARIz.J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 457, 487-90 (2015)
(examining the current legal framework that governs climate change-related
migration and offering solutions to fill gaps in current policies). Scholars and other
stakeholders are increasingly exploring these gaps in other migration contexts as well.
See, e.g., Sanjula Weerasinghe et al., On the Margins: Noncitizens Caught in Countries
Experiencing Violence, Conflict and Disaster, 3J. ON MIGRATION & HUm. SECURITY 26, 29-30
(2015) (exploring the effect of several different humanitarian crises on noncitizens'
ability to seek relief because they were not citizens of the countries where the crises
occurred); Sharon Stanton Russell, Refugees: Risks and Challenges Worldwide, MIGRATION
POL'Y INST. (Nov. 1, 2002), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/refugees-risks-
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countries in Central America sharply expose the limits of the Refugee
Convention, which was designed for a post-World War II context that
bears little resemblance to the context driving forced migration today.8
In the United States, the Central American migrants particularly
expose those limits as government officials hear and decide their
claims as part of the U.S. immigration system. By contrast, Syrian
refugees arriving in the United States have already secured their
refugee status through a lengthy status determination and security
vetting process overseas.9 Although there are similarities between the
needs of these two very different forced migrations, this Article focuses
primarily on the Central American migrants.
Thus far, the conversation in the United States about how best to
conceptualize the Central American migrants fleeing violence has
involved a debate between protection and deterrence, setting those two
values in unnecessary opposition to each other.10 Those who emphasize
protection tend to define the displacement as a refugee problem."
Doing so summons the mandatory protection framework of the
Refugee Convention at and within our borders, wherein the United States
cannot return people to places where they fear persecution on any one
of five protected grounds. 2  Significantly, when the Refugee
and-challenges-worldwide (explaining that the term "refugee," as defined by the
Refugee Convention, "excludes people who move primarily for economic reasons" and
people who seek asylum).
8. See Andrew I. Schoenholtz, The New Refugees and the Old Treaty: Persecutors and
Persecuted in the Twenty-First Century, 16 CHI.J. INT'L L. 81, 85, 93-94 (2015).
9. For a thorough explanation of the difference between refugee claims and
asylum claims, see Nicole Ostrand, The Syrian Refugee Crisis: A Comparison of Responses
by Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States, 3 J. ON MIGRATION & HUM.
SECURITY 255 (2015).
10. See KEVIN APPLEBY ET AL., CTR. FOR MIGRATION STUD. & SCALABRINI INT'L
MIGRATION NETWORK, THE CENTRAL AMERICAN HUMANITARIAN CRISIS AND US POLICY
RESPONSES 1-3 (Sept. 2016), http://cmsny.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/
CAReport-Galley-Final-New.pdf (reporting that the United States has struggled with
both protection and deterrence strategies to control Central American migration); see
also Dara Lind, The Paradox at the Heart of Obama s Central American Refugee Policy, Vox
(Jan. 25, 2016, 9:10 AM), https://www.vox.com/2016/1/25/10826010/refugee-
deport-central-america (portraying the United States' inability "to balance the
humanitarian need to make the right decisions against the deterrent need to deport
people" as a "life and death" situation).
11. See Lind, supra note 10.
12. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (42) (2012) (enumerating the five protected grounds as
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, and political
opinion); see also Refugee Convention, supra note 2, 189 U.N.T.S. at 152 (providing
2017]
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Convention applies, those in the United States who qualify for its protections
may earn a benefit of enormous value: a path to U.S. citizenship.1"
Within the debate, the protection-side undervalues the limitations
inherent in the Refugee Convention itself and focuses on improving
access to a form of protection that, despite its malleable edges, is not
designed for the breadth of these situations. The Refugee Convention
protects those who have been or would be uniquely targeted and
persecuted on account of a protected characteristic, such as religion
or political opinion," and not those fleeing "generalized violence.""
Some of those seeking refuge in the United States from Central
America do meet the Convention's narrow definition, and even more
importantly, have the ability to articulate and prove that they do-
these are conventional refugees. But many refugees do not fit the
definition or have great difficulty proving that they do. Even at its
fullest interpretive extent, the Refugee Convention does not
encompass all those seeking refuge in the United States, and all those
whom this Article argues merit some form of protection.
In contrast to those who emphasize the protection imperative, those
who emphasize deterrence view these migrations as a security problem
for both the migrants and the United States itself, or sometimes as a
fiscal burden. 6 For the migrants' own safety, and for the security of
U.S. borders, these voices wish to deter the migrants from taking the
trip in the first place.' 7 The security concerns for the migrants are
undeniable, with a high percentage of migrants reporting rape,
assaults, robbery, extortion, and other harrowing experiences along
the route, and with many dying along the way." Some security
the international law foundation for refugee protection, including the five categories
on which U.S. refugee status relies).
13. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1159(a)-(b) (establishing a path to lawful permanent
residence for refugees and immigrants who satisfy certain criteria).
14. Refugee Convention, supra note 2, 189 U.N.T.S. at 152; see also Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267
[hereinafter Refugee Protocol] (modifying the Refugee Convention's definition of
"refugee" but keeping the same protected characteristics or categories).
15. Asylum & the Rights of Refugees, INT'L JUST. RES. CR.,
http://www.ijrcenter.org/refugee-law (last visited Oct. 23, 2017).
16. See Lind, supra note 10.
17. See id.
18. Peter Orsi, Report Paints Harrowing Picture of Central American Migration, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP. (May 11, 2017, 9:25 PM), https://www.usnews.com/
news/world/articles /2017-05-11 /report-paints-harrowing-picture-of-central-america-
migration (reporting that "heightened immigration enforcement by the United States
and Mexico threatens to make more refugees and migrants vulnerable to exploitation"
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concerns for the United States are defensible, such as the concerns
about specific individuals with close ties to organized crime or drug
trafficking. Other concerns, however, are overstated, such as the
concern for diversion of law enforcement resources to the border.
This resulted in an indefensible policy that treated individual migrants
as security risks merely because the migrants as a whole required
diversion of law enforcement resources to the border-a policy later
struck down by the courts and rescinded by the Obama
Administration.19 Whichever justification for deterrence carries the
day, the deterrence emphasis relies on narrow interpretations of an
already narrow Refugee Convention, and it ignores the acute need for
some form of protection for vulnerable populations. 0 The deterrent-
side also ignores how these migrants may have claims to protection.
Apart from and broader than claims made under the Refugee
Convention, these claims are often recognized internationally in
situations of mass forced migrations.21 In the Central American case,
these claims are further strengthened by the history between the
and recognizing that about seven out of ten persons experience violence while fleeing
to the United States from the Northern Triangle and Mexico).
19. See R.I.L-Rv. Johnson, 80 F. Supp. 3d 164, 189-90 (D.D.C. 2015) (rejecting the
government's "general deterrence" defense to detaining Central American asylum-
seekers and stating that "the Court finds the Government's interest here particularly
insubstantial.... It claims that such Central American immigration implicates
,national security interests,' .... It argues, in essence, that such migrations force ICE
to 'divert resources from other important security concerns' ..... The simple fact that
increased immigration takes up government resources cannot necessarily make its
deterrence a matter of national security,.....); id. at 188-89 (concluding that the
government exceeds its authority to detain "one particular individual" when it does so
to "send [] a message of deterrence to other Central American individuals who may be
considering immigration"); see also RANJANA NATARAJAN ET AL., REPORT REGARDING
GRAVE RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IMPLICATED IN FAMILY IMMIGRATION DETENTION AT THE
KARNES COUNTY DETENTION CENTER 1-2 (Sept. 26. 2014), https://law.utexas.edu/wp-
content/uploads/sites/11/2015/04/2014-10-IC-IACHRKarnesReport.pdf
(critiquing government "insist[ence] on expanding family detention" and
exemplifying how family detention at one Texas detention center "violates
international and domestic human rights and civil rights protections for the women
and children held behind bars").
20. The dominance of the deterrence paradigm also explains the continued
reliance on deterrence as a response to the most recent "crisis," despite continued calls
from scholars and civil society for a more protection-oriented and sustainable response.
21. See U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial
Application of Non-Refoulement Obligations under the 1951 Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees and Its 1967 Protocol, 14-15 (Jan. 26, 2007) [hereinafter
U.N. Advisory Opinion], http://www.unhcr.org/4d9486929.pdf.
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United States and the affected countries that is a root cause of this
particular migration.22 The deterrent-side too often ignores this
distinct claim to protection.
This Article posits that the goals of deterrence and protection have
been needlessly set in opposition to each other, perhaps an inevitable
result of focusing on the Refugee Convention as the starting and
ending point of protection. The Refugee Convention has been
extraordinarily durable, and even considering the many well-placed
critiques and ongoing efforts to improve its implementation, 3 it
deserves enormous credit both for lives saved and for integrating
international human rights so robustly into many states' domestic laws.
It has also, to some extent, adapted through the years to new kinds of
persecution. 24  Nonetheless, the Refugee Convention's focus on
particular, targeted individuals fits uneasily with broader forced
migrations of people, and has led to an unfortunate binary between
"deserving" asylum-seekers and mere "economic migrants. "'2 As
Professor Ramji-Nogales noted, "Scholars of international migration
law recognize that this binary does not adequately capture the range
of reasons for migrating. There are many compelling drivers of
migration that do not fall within the narrow international legal
definition of a refugee. '26 We can conceive such non-binary migrants
as unconventional refugees.
This Article breaks apart this binary by asking what duty the
international community, and more specifically the United States,
might owe to unconventional refugees. Forced migration
encompasses a population broader than those who meet the definition
of a refugee, although it certainly includes those who have a
demonstrable, individualized claim to refugee status under the
Refugee Convention.2 7  This concern for a more-encompassing
22. See infra Section II.B.1.
23. See generally Joan Fitzpatrick, Revitalizing the 1951 Refugee Convention, 9 HARV.
HUM. RTS. J. 229, 231 (1996) (exploring ways that the Refugee Convention, though
"incomplete," remains relevant despite criticisms that suggest it is obsolete, too vague,
or burdensome to implement).
24. See Schoenholtz, supra note 8, at 91, 99-101 (examining whether the Refugee
Convention can protect individuals from persecution by non-state actors).
25. Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Migration Emergencies, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 609, 611 (2017).
26. Id.
27. SeeArthur C. Helton & ElianaJacobs, Mhat Is Forced Migration ?, 13 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 521,528 (1999) (proposing "forced migrant, as a separate and broader legal category
with corresponding remedies," which would avoid changing the scope of the Refugee
Convention's definition for "refugee").
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nomenclature matches this Article's concern for a legal framework
that also encompasses more than refugees.2"
The Refugee Convention and its limits anchor this discussion, but it
is not the only law at play in the forced migrations of the past years.
Complementary forms of individualized protection appear throughout
U.S. immigration law, past and present.2 9 In Part I, this Article focuses
on the many precedents within U.S. immigration law for providing
protection that is more broadly available than protection provided by
the Refugee Convention. These are typically nationality-based statuses,
and range from the highly valuable protection of the Cuban
Adjustment Act30 ("CAA") to the much less durable protection offered by
Temporary Protected Status 1 (TPS) designations for specific countries
like Syria. The range in value provides critical insights into a more flexible
way of thinking about protection, beyond the all-or-nothing framework.
Having considered the precedents in U.S. law, past and present, this
Article turns in Part II to ethical and philosophical justifications for
providing broader protections in certain circumstances, looking at
vigorous, ongoing philosophical debates surrounding the extent and
nature of a nation-state's right to exclude would-be migrants. One
branch of the debate flows from philosopher John Rawls's "original
position,"" and has been articulated in the migration context by
28. Sharing Professor Ramji-Nogales's critique of the limitations of the crisis
construct, I also avoid the term "crisis migration." Scholars examining "crisis
migration" have done important work in showing how vulnerable migrants may or may
not fit existing categories within international law. See Susan Martin et al., What is Crisis
Migration?, 45 FORCED MIGRATION REv. 5-6 (Feb. 2014),
http: //www.fmreview.org/ sites /fmr /files /FMRdownloads /en /crisis /martin-
weerasinghe-taylor.pdf (recognizing that not all migrants are refugees or forced
migrants). This Article shares much in common with their important project but
eschews the word "crisis," which typically signifies something acute and of short
duration; Northern Triangle dynamics are long-term, and we must view them as such.
See infra Section II.B.
29. See infra Part I.
30. Cuban Adjustment Act, Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161 (1966) (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (2012)) (placing Cubans on a path to citizenship one year
after arrival.
31. 8 U.S.C. § 1254a (declaring no path to citizenship no matter how long TPS lasts).
32. This is discussed further in Section II.A infra, but can be summarized at its most
basic as answering the question of what laws one would choose for a nation if
determining them from behind a "veil of ignorance"-lack of knowledge of one's
position in the society whose rules one is attempting to create.
2017]
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Michael Walzer. This view ascribes higher duties to those within a
nation's borders, seeing a fundamental right to community self-
determination, with some subsidiary right to determine the pace of
cultural change that can be hastened by immigration. 4 The other
branch of the debate, first forcefully articulated by philosopherJoseph
Carens, takes Rawls's "original position" and considers it on a global
level, trying to understand what rules of migration would be adopted
if the people making the rules had no idea whether they would be
citizens of, for this example, the United States or El Salvador."5 This
side often justifies open-or more open-borders. 6
This Article sits within these two outer positions, in a place
sometimes called "weak cosmopolitanism.3 7 This position recognizes
that while our greatest duties may be owed to our co-citizens, we still
have duties to people outside our borders when their basic rights-
including that of safety-are at stake. 8 Contextual factors, like those
underlying the causes of Northern Triangle 9 migration, also create a
responsibility to deal with the predictable effects of those crises.40 We
likewise have duties to those within our borders, especially as they
accrue significant ties within our borders.41 This middle ground
provides a way to thoughtfully consider the often baldly overstated, and
33. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY
144 (1983).
34. Id.
35. SeeJOSEPH H. CARENS, THE ETHICS OF IMMIGRATION 298 (2013).
36. Id. at 255, 288.
37. James Ryerson, Deep Thinking About Immigration, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2016)
(book review), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/31/books/review/immigration-
strangers-in-our-midst-david-miller.html ("A weak cosmopolitan believes in the equal
worth of all human beings but sees this as morally compatible with giving special
consideration to our compatriots.").
38. See id. (explaining that a weak cosmopolitan seeks to protect human rights but
"does not have an obligation to accept any would-be immigrants").
39. The Northern Triangle is an area of Central America comprised of El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras from which many migrants depart en route to the southern
U.S. border. Danielle Renwick, Central America's Violent Northern Triangle, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN REL., https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/central-americas-violent-northern-
triangle (last updated Jan. 19, 2016).
40. Professor Ramji-Nogales provided a trenchant critique of seeing these
migrants as a "crisis," and instead looking at the inevitability of population flows in
light of broader U.S. foreign policy. Ramji-Nogales, supra note 25, at 620-21, 653-54.
41. Seyla Benhabib, The Morality of Migration, N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR (July 29,
2012, 5:00 PM), https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/29/stone-
immigration (asserting that refugees and asylees deserve a path to citizenship if they have
assimilated to local culture and formed important relationships in their communities).
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racially-tinged, concerns about how refugees hurt Americans; deep
within that concern lies a sense of Michael Walzer's articulation of our
right to community self-determination. At the same time, by asking us
to define when and to what extent we do have duties to those beyond
our borders, this approach provides a way to understand why
unconventional refugees might call on a nation to respond.
After examining the philosophical terrain that helps us understand
the values and choices underlying migration policy, this Article turns
in Part III to more pragmatic justifications for offering broader
protection. Here, we see how our current system serves none of the
multiple goals we might imagine for handling forced migration:
deterrence, promotion of the rule of law, short-term security, long-
term integration, and administrative efficiency.
Instead, the current patchwork system places heavy demands on the
legal system, in part by inhibiting migrants from even claiming the
rights available to them under current narrow legal frameworks. As a
result, this patchwork system needlessly absorbs governmental and
advocate resources alike and offers little to no stability for the migrants,
all while siloing the immigration response from the project of
addressing root causes.42 Here, this Article suggests that our long-term
shared interests are better served by focusing intensely on sustainable
development and good governance initiatives in the Northern
Triangle, and on creating better long-term outcomes for the
communities in the United States where forced migrants settle.
With these concerns and justifications elucidated, this Article
proposes a protection framework in Part IV that supplements asylum
protection instead of replacing it. In addition to asylum, with its strong
protection and relatively clear commitment to integration," the
migrants fleeing Central American violence need a broader remedy
42. See DONALD M. KERWIN, MIGRATION POL'Y INST., THE FALTERING U.S. REFUGEE
PROTECTION SYSTEM: LEGAL AND POLICY RESPONSES TO REFUGEES, ASYLUM SEEKERS, AND
OTHERS IN NEED OF PROTECTION 1, 3-13, 28 (2011),
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/refugeeprotectio
n-2011.pdf; see also Ouisa Davis, Our Patchwork Immigration Laws, SHREVEPORT TIMES
(June 8, 2017, 4:47 PM), http://www.shreveporttimes.com/story/opinion/
columnists/ouisa-davis/2017/06/08/us-patchwork-history-immigration-laws-
davis/102644434 (providing a brief history of U.S. immigration laws).
43. Section II.B of this Article, infra, acknowledges some of the limitations of this
commitment to integration, but nonetheless sees it as an option that performs well vis-
Ai-vis the goal of integration.
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that is easier for the United States to administer and easier for migrants
to access, but one with less intrinsic value than refugee or asylee status.
This proposed framework comes with two important caveats. First,
the framework absolutely requires concurrent attention to and
investment in the promotion of security and governance in the
Northern Triangle, so that even as we protect people from grave and
immediate dangers, we are reducing the conditions that send them
seeking such protection in the first place.44 The content of that
concurrent sine qua non is beyond the scope of this Article and is
better left to scholars and experts in the field of international
development who have been actively engaged in this work for many
years preceding this current migration. But it behooves those who are
concerned with the treatment of migrants in the United States to
remember that this concurrent work is happening, and that the work
profoundly affects the work of immigrant rights domestically.
The second caveat is simply that the proposed framework is intended
to provoke conversations and critiques, not to suggest that it is a fully
conceived, pragmatically-achievable proposal. The major goal of this
Article is to justify doing more. The goal of the framework itself is
simply to help break open a conversation about what protection could
look like, instead of only looking at time-consuming, resource-
intensive, slow, never-adequate fixes to the protection system we
currently have.4" Those changes and fixes are critical, but stepping
back to reimagine something different is equally critical. Will a
broader program deter those with valid asylum claims from seeking
that better status? Will it open the floodgates of migration? How could
such a program be administered? Part III acknowledges those
questions and good readers will find more risks and issues than this
Article identifies. I am modest and realistic enough to know, with
certainty, that I alone cannot devise a new system; the goal is therefore
44. See SLAVOJ ZIZEK, AGAINST THE DOUBLE BLACKMAIL: REFUGEES, TERROR AND
OTHER TROUBLES WITH THE NEIGHBORS 111, 117-18 (2016) (urging a look at root
causes of migration into Europe and worker solidarity).
45. See Gabrielle Giffords, Immigration Reform: The Time is Now, ARIz. ATT'Y, July-
Aug. 2009, at 29, http://www.azattorneymag-digital.com/azattorneymag/20090708
(stressing comprehensive reform that addresses temporary workers and crime but
opposing amnesty); Lee Ann Russo & Bob Glaves, Fixing the Immigration System: A
Roadmap for Reform, and a Place for the Legal Community to Lead, CBA REC., OCT. 2011, at
36, 38-39, http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/eb887b97-c2be-4f67-aldc-
e78984290d9c/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/be5f57e2-5882-456b-b29a-
e88dee2920fb/feature russo.pdf (proposing a fix that focuses on the economic needs
of the United States but allows certain flexibilities for refugees and asylees).
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the more reasonable one of breaking open the conversation. The
principle of non-refoulement, which forbids a country receiving
refugees from returning them to a country where their "life or freedom
would be threatened on account of [their] race, religion, nationality,
member of a particular social group [,] or political opinion,"46 was once
novel and now constitutes a powerful principle of international law.
4 7
A new principle for protecting unconventional refugees may also be
possible, but only if we begin the task of imagining it.
I. PRECEDENTS FOR BROADER PROTECTION IN U.S. HISTORY
At this time in American history, with immigration an explosive
factor in national and local politics alike, an article exploring broader
protection for migrants clearly cuts against the political grain. So much of
immigration-related policy in the early twenty-first century has focused
on restriction and enforcement; this tendency affects both the somewhat
durable asylum regime, and even sympathetic legislation like that offering
status to the undocumented young people known as the DREAMers.48
And yet, even now, there are examples of broad-scale protection
within our current immigration laws. TPS is a countrywide designation
limited only by the need for the individual to be admissible and to have
arrived and continuously resided in the United States by certain
dates.49 The CAA is another countrywide designation, and it is even
more generous than TPS because it has no date restrictions and leads
quickly to lawful permanent residence, which provides a path to
citizenship. 5o This Section's discussion of both forms of relief considers
them with an eye to administrative efficiency and effectiveness, their
effect creating or diminishing the migration dynamics, and their
impact on root causes of migration. By looking at benefits and
criticisms of these programs, this Article extracts principles that could
46. U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Note on Non-Refoulement (Submitted by
the High Commissioner) EC/SCP/2 (Aug. 23, 1977), http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/
excom/scip/3ae68ccdl /note-non-refoulement-submitted-high-commissioner.html.
47. See U.N. Advisory Opinion, supra note 21, at 5-6, 9, 14-15 (defining non-
refoulement and identifying the principle as "a rule of customary international
law... [that] is binding on all States").
48. See Elizabeth Keyes, Defining American: The DREAM Act, Immigration Reform and
Citizenship, 14 NEV. L.J. 101, 103 (2013) ("[T]he DREAM Act... has been introduced
in Congress every year since 2001 without ever passing both chambers.").
49. See8 U.S.C. § 1254a(a) (1), (c)(1)(A) (2012).
50. See Cuban Adjustment Act, Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161 (1966) (codified
as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (2012)).
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help build a more effective framework for responding to the forced
migrations that we see in the twenty-first century.
A. Cuban Adjustment Act
The CAA of 1966, which is still in effect, provides broad and deep
relief for one nationality. The Act emerged after a three-year "surge"
of Cubans into the United States immediately following the Cuban
revolution."l As Professors Joyce Hughes and Alexander Alum note,
"These individuals left Cuba between 1959 and 1962, and did not
expect their exile to be permanent; that is, they expected to return
home to Cuba upon the imminent dissolution or overthrow of Castro's
government. ' ' 52 Smaller numbers followed between 1962 and 1965,
with the suspension of air travel between the United States and Cuba,
making travel more dangerous for would-be migrants.51 In 1965, many
Cubans came through boatlifts, but were only paroled into the United
States, and thus in a legal limbo (as described below, with humanitarian
parole).54  The disorder of the boatlifts and the desire for a more
durable and prompt status created the impetus for the CAA.7
The CAA created a direct path to lawful permanent residence for
these Cubans without needing to qualify under any of the immigrant
visa eligibility categories in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)
or demonstrating that they met the definition of a refugee . 6  As
originally enacted, the law offered permanent residence to any "native
or citizen of Cuba ... who has been inspected and admitted or paroled
51. SeeJavier Arteaga, Comment, The Cuban AdjustmentAct of 1966: More than Forty
Years Later a Proposal for the Future, 3 FIU L. REv. 509, 509-10, 517-18 (2008).
52. Joyce A. Hughes & Alexander L. Alum, Rethinking the Cuban Adjustment Act and
the U.S. National Interest, 23 ST. THoMAS L. REv. 187, 194 (2011).
53. See Arteaga, supra note 51, at 518 (recalling that more than 70,000 Cubans
came to the United States by sea from 1962 to 1965 when travel by air was not possible
because of the Cuban Missile Crisis).
54. Note, The Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966: Mirando por los Ojos de Don Quijote o
Sancho Panza?, 114 HARv. L. REv. 902, 907, 914 (2001).
55. See id. at 908 (highlighting that Congress had four main purposes in enacting the
CAA: (1) to further the Cold War objectives by "destabilizing Communist dictatorship [s]";
(2) to lower administrative barriers for Cubans seeking U.S. refuge; (3) to eliminate the
need for Cuban refugees to apply for permanent residence outside of the United States;
and (4) to create an efficient pathway for Cuban refugees tojoin the workforce).
56. Hughes & Alum, supra note 52, at 188. Attorney Daniel Melo, who has
represented numerous CAA clients, notes that at the outset, the applicants must also
provide police clearances from jurisdictions where they have lived. Notes from
Attorney Melo (on file with author).
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into the United States subsequent to January 1, 1959 ' '57 with two years
of physical presence in the United States.s
Cubans benefited from special, more favorable rules concerning
adjustment. "Adjustment" means adjusting from some other status like
the "nonimmigrant" status of tourist or worker-or under narrow, rare
circumstances that of undocumented migrant-to the "immigrant" status of
lawful permanent resident, or "green card" holder.59  Generally,
adjustment has provisions that limit its availability, such as the current
availability of an immigrant visa and the requirement of entering
lawfully. These and other bars to adjustment do not apply under the CAA.
Professors Hughes and Alum have provided a thorough analysis of
the four goals the CAA set out to achieve. Among the goals was
protection of Cuban dissidents, alongside the overarching foreign
policy goal of embarrassing a Cold War foe and potentially
destabilizing the Cuban government by accepting so many exiles.60 But
the legislative history and the structure of the Act showed attention to
other goals as well.61 Among the goals was integration of Cubans into
the U.S. workforce because Cubans who had come prior to the CAA
were in a tenuous legal status with limited possibilities for integration.62
Administrative efficiency was another important goal of the CAA. As
Hughes and Alum write, "[T]he CAA was passed to alleviate the
57. Cuban Adjustment Act, Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161 (1966) (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (2012)) (adjusting the status of Cuban refugees to that of
lawful permanent residents of the United States).
58. Congress amended the CAAwith the INAAmendments of 1976, requiring only
one year of physical presence before offering lawful permanent residence. Pub. L. No.
94-571, § 9, 90 Stat. 2703, 2707 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (2012)).
59. "Immigrant" is a term of art in the INA, which divides visas into nonimmigrant
visas, generally for temporary purposes, and immigrant visas, which provide lawful
permanent residence. Compare Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. 82-
414, § 101 (a) (15), 66 Stat. 163, 167 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a))
(listing the many different visa categories for nonimmigrants), with Pub. L. 82-414,
§ 203, 66 Stat. 163, 178-79 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1153) (defining the
categories of immigrant visas). Immigrant visas are numerically limited and are subject
to per-country quotas, creating wait times for the visas in many categories, and for
many countries. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, VISA BULLETIN: IMMIGRANT NUMBERS FOR
JANUARY 2017 1 (Dec. 12, 2016), https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/
Bulletins/visabulletinJanuary20l7.pdf (acknowledging that INA section 201 sets an
annual limit for family-sponsored visas).
60. Hughes & Alum, supra note 52, at 195-96.
61. See Arteaga, supra note 51, at 514-17 (noting that the United States
implemented the CAA as an effort to destroy Communism in Cuba and to integrate
Cubans with professional skills into the workforce).
62. Id.
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administrative burden on both Cuban exiles who wanted to become
U.S. permanent residents, and U.S. diplomatic facilities in Canada and
Mexico that lacked the resources to process the visa applications of
Cubans paroled into the United States."6 Attorney Melo captures how
this efficiency works in practice, noting that this is "[t] he beauty of
humanitarian parole," which permits entry-barring criminal or
terrorism issues detected at the border-and defers more complicated
admissibility and deportability issues to the adjustment stage,
permitting sound adjudication of cases without further clogging the
immigration court process.64 Likewise, it removes the processing from
consulates overseas and places it within a well-developed adjudicatory
framework domestically.
The CAA has provided a clear and administratively less cumbersome
path for Cubans. As Professor David Abraham writes,
It has acted as a strong magnet for both humble fishermen and all-
star baseball players. Indeed, since its inception, over 770,000
Cubans-130,000 in the Mariel boatlifts of 1980 alone-have come
to the United States under its provisions and outside of normal
immigration opportunities [such as the Special Cuban Migration
Lottery] .... As we shall see, over time, the iconic rafter has been
joined by Cubans travelling more comfortably, including legally to
Mexico, who are then welcomed when they appear at the same
U.S./Mexican border where Mexicans are turned back.
Abraham criticizes the CAA, however, for its presumption that all
those leaving Cuba were political refugees. He draws a comparison
between Cuban migrants, who are welcomed, and Haitian migrants,
who are presumed to be economic migrants only and who are received
far more skeptically, if at all.66
The CAA has come under increasing criticism as relations between
the United States and Cuba have changed. Among the criticisms are
that it creates a powerful magnet for people whom the law was not
intended to benefit: those fleeing the Castro regime for political
reasons.6 7  This reflects a divide between older and newer Cuban
63. Hughes & Alum, supra note 52, at 197.
64. Notes from Attorney Melo (on file with author).
65. David Abraham, The Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966: Past and Future (Univ. of
Miami Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2015-11, 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id 2642451#-#.
66. See id.
67. See id. (declaring that "the CAA seems to have become a victim of its own
success" and questioning the notion that all Cubans who have entered the United
States are political refugees or asylees).
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migrants, as reported by Lizette Alvarez of the NewYork Times: "Many
earlier immigrants say the law should only protect Cubans fleeing
political oppression. Newer immigrants, who benefit most from the
law, are more likely to support its blanket application to all Cuban
immigrants. But the Cubans who have been here longest have the
most political clout."68  Professor Abraham also comments on this
divide, "To their great annoyance, the Miami elites can no longer
count on Cuban immigrants to be politically hostile to the Castro
government. The reservoir of class or ideological opponents has long
been tapped out, and today's immigrants are increasingly mestizo and
at peace with their home country's politics.
69
In 2016, in the wake of the thawing relations between Cuba and the
United States, the Miami Herald noted the unintended consequences
of the Act:
The prospect of legal residency in the United States is what drives
the migration. Once here, they remit hundreds of millions of dollars
back home, from which the government takes a cut. U.S. law acts as
a safety valve to release internal discontent with conditions in Cuba,
and, at the same time, lets the regime continue repressing those who
remain behind. This is not what the law ever contemplated.70
The editorial goes on to argue, "These days, real dissidents are able to
leave Cuba and make a case for political asylum in the United States
without relying on the [CAAJ ."71
After five decades of implementation, it is perhaps inevitable that
the Act no longer meets all of its original goals. Of those goals, critics
persuasively show how the foreign policy goal has diminished
dramatically and how the goal of providing refuge to dissidents could
fit within standard asylum law and processes. 72 Critics, however, have
less to say about the Act's two other goals: integration and
administrative efficiency, both of which remain valuable. 73  The
changing, sometimes competing, value of any of these goals raises a
68. Lizette Alvarez, Law Favoring Cuban Arrivals is Challenged, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1,
2015), http: //www.nytimes.com /2015 /02/ 02 /us /law-favoring-cuba-arrivals-is-
challenged.html.
69. Abraham, supra note 65.
70. Miami Herald Editorial Board, Repeal the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966, MIAMI
HERALD (Apr. 16, 2016, 1:00 PM), http://www.miamiherald.com/opinion/editorials/
article72163832.html.
71. Id.
72. See infra Section III.C (challenging the accurate, appealing argument by
showing how unrealistic it is).
73. See Alvarez, supra note 68.
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point that this Article will return to: that a good law should have a "fit"
between its goals and the value of what it delivers. In the case of the
CAA, it delivers an extremely high-value benefit-lawful permanent
residence-which may have been appropriate when it was meeting all
four articulated goals in its early years of implementation. Increasing
recent criticism of the Act, however, suggests that fit between value and
goals no longer exists.
B. Nationality-Based Presumptions of Refugee Eligibility
In 1989, Congress passed a law with the Lautenberg Amendment,
which created categories of people within several nations who were,
without further individual scrutiny, refugees. 74  Specifically, the
provision directed the Secretary of State and the Coordinator of
Refugee Affairs to establish categories for nationals and residents of
the Soviet Union "who share common characteristics that identify
them as targets of persecution in the Soviet Union on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion"; a separate part of the Amendment specified that
Soviet Jews were one such group. 7' The provision created that same
mechanism for categories of Vietnamese, Laotian, and Cambodians
who faced persecution.
76
As implemented, the Lautenberg Amendment makes it easier for
individuals from the selected countries to gain asylum. 77 Paired with
the cap on the total numbers of refugees who could be admitted to the
United States in any given fiscal year (FY), the Lautenberg Amendment
resulted in these countries receiving eighty-three percent of the
available overseas refugee slots. 78 Congress has extended this provision
repeatedly. For example, in 2004, Congress expanded the provision to
cover religious minorities within Iran. 79 The provision continues to
have force: in FY 2015, 4180 migrants entered the United States
74. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations
Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-167, § 599D, 103 Stat. 1195, 1261-63 (1989) (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1157 (2012)) [hereinafter Lautenberg Amendment].
75. § 599D, 103 Stat. 1195, 1262.
76. Id.
77. ANDORRA BRUNO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31269, REFUGEE ADMISSIONS AND
RESETTLEMENT POLICY 9 (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL31269.pdf.
78. Susan Raufer, In-Counby Pmcessingof Refugees, 9 GEO. IMMIGR. Lj. 233,233-34 (1995).
79. Melanie Nezer, Religion in Immigration Law, 05-7IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1, 18 (2005).
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through the Lautenberg Amendment's provisions with more than half
from the former Soviet Union and the rest from Iran. 0
C. Temporay Protected Status
In contrast to the CAA, TPS provides a far less valuable source of
broad protection. TPS exists for specific countries that the U.S.
government has deemed too dangerous or devastated by natural
disaster to be able to absorb those being deported from the United
States."1 Similar programs existed before 1990, including Deferred
Enforced Departure ("DED") 2 (still in effect for Liberia) and
Extended Voluntary Departure ("EVD") " (used for Salvadorans), and
the Executive Branch still has authority to institute such programs as a
form of prosecutorial discretion. 4 In 1990, Congress created the
authority for TPS.s5  It flowed from "legislative proposals for
'temporary safe haven,' as it was then termed, to regularize the
procedures for offering protection to individuals who could not safely
return to their countries, but who were not covered by existing
refugee, asylum[,] or other immigration benefits law." 6  The
Congressional Research Service in 2016 described TPS as the "statutory
embodiment of safe haven for those migrants who may not meet the
legal definition of refugee but are nonetheless fleeing-or reluctant to
return to-potentially dangerous situations.
' 7
Currently, thirteen countries have a TPS designation, including two
of the three Northern Triangle countries: Honduras (designated in
1998) and El Salvador (designated in 2001)."8 The designation does
80. See Press Release, Adam Schiff, Representative, Rep. Schiff Announces
Extension of Lautenberg Amendment for Iranian Religious Minorities Fleeing
Persecution Included in Omnibus (Dec. 22, 2015), https://schiff.house.gov/news/
press-releases/rep-schiff-announces-extension-of-lautenberg-amendment-for-iranian-
religious-minorities-fleeing-persecution-included-in-omnibus (announcing Congress's
extension of a program to aid persecuted Iranian Christians via the Lautenberg Amendment).
81. Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, FOJA Response from USCIS on Parole, PENN ST. L. 12-
41 (Oct. 2014), https://works.bepress.com/shoba wadhia/32/download.
82. Id. at 25-26 (describing DED as within the discretionary power of the President).
83. Id. at 19 (explaining the origins of EVD as a precursor program to the DED).
84. CARLA N. ARGUETA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20844, TEMPORARY PROTECTED
STATUS: CURRENT IMMIGRATION POLICYAND ISSUES 3 (2017), https://www.fas.org/sgp/
crs/homesec/RS20844.pdf.
85. Id. at 2 & n.5, 4 (referring to section 244 of the INA).
86. Wadhia, supra note 81, at 19.
87. ARGUETA, supra note 84, at 2.
88. Id. at 3-4, 9 (explaining that there is great variance between TPS designated
countries in the number of recipients).
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not mean that those migrating currently from these two countries can
apply for TPS. Hondurans continuously resident since December 1998
are eligible, and Salvadorans continuously resident since February
2001 are eligible. The third Northern Triangle country, Guatemala,
has no TPS designation at all.8 9
The program's beauty is its administrative simplicity. The eligibility
requirements are discrete with clearly drawn lines and relatively few
complicated legal concepts. An applicant needs to prove nationality,
continuous presence in the United States as of a particular date, and
continuous residence as of a particular date. 90 The applicants need to
answer sixty-nine questions about admissibility which track the
inadmissibility grounds found in INA section 212;91 applicants can cure
most issues of inadmissibility by filing a waiver with the application.
There are few interpretive ambiguities that would require in-depth
legal representation, so many TPS applicants can avail themselves of
"clinics" that explain the process and assist with filling in the
paperwork, which makes it easier to access than many other
immigration statuses and permits greater access tojustice than statuses
like asylum, SIJS, or crime victim visas.
The two main criticisms of TPS focus on the "temporary" nature of
the status.92 First, those who favor immigration restriction see it as an
unintendedly large passageway to status in the United States. Second,
those who are concerned with the creation of de facto second-class
citizens. The 1990 law creating TPS understood the status to be of
relatively short duration-anywhere from a few months to 18 months.
The reality is that most countries' TPS designations renew repeatedly,
meaning that people can have TPS and work lawfully in the United
States for a decade and more. As they work here, they develop stronger
ties to the community, and stronger equities against deportation. As
noted as early as 1995,
89. Id. at 9. TPS marginally relates to current flows because those with TPS are
considered qualifying relatives for purposes of the small CAM program discussed below.
90. See Temporay Protected Status, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVICES,
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protected-status (last updated May
24, 2017) [hereinafter USCIS TPS]. The legal standards differ slightly between
continuous presence and continuous residence, but the evidence for both is similar.
91. Id.; 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1)-(10) (2012) (providing different grounds for
rejecting visa applications or admission into the United States, such as health-related,
criminal, national security, or public charge grounds).
92. Claire Bergeron, Temporary Protected Status after 25 Years: Addressing the Challenge
of Long-Tern "Temporay" Residents and Strengthening a Centerpiece of US Humanitarian
Protection, 2J. ON MIGRATION & HUM. SECURITY 22, 22 (2014).
[Vol. 67:89
UNCONVENTIONAL REFUGEES
Recipients of TPS begin to build their lives outside their country
while still unsure whether the INS will eventually retract temporary
protection .... [I]t should be recognized that dangerous
conditions in the home country have not been of a temporary nature
and that TPS recipients have built up equities in their respective
communities.
93
For restrictionists, this means that the program has not met its
objectives, but instead offers people a de facto unending pass to
relatively secure status in the United States, contrary to the rule of law.
They also argue that programs like TPS create a magnet for future
migration, as migrants may trust that some program will emerge to
provide some form of status for them in the future. 94 This latter
argument is merely hypothetical, as a TPS designation is fairly rare,
and most often tied to natural disasters, not man-made strife. The first
criticism, however, has some validity. TPS designation is intended to
be temporary, and never contemplated the situation of countries being
re-designated year after year, well past the duration of the precipitating
disaster or strife. 9' Yet, because TPS is valuable to both its recipients
and to the designated countries (especially in the form of remittances),
the Executive Branch is pressured to re-designate far longer than
would seem valid given the justification for the original designation. 96
The Salvadoran and Honduras TPS designation, for example, came in
light of Hurricane Mitch in 1998. Enormous international aid flowed
in for recovery efforts, and according to multiple sources, those efforts
93. Bill Frelick & Barbara Kohnen, Filling the Gap: Temporay Protected Status,
8J. REFUGEE STUD. 339, 357 (1995).
94. This criticism was thrown with more power at the previous version of TPS, EVD:
If it is not particularly difficult for an affected nationality to come to this
country, the effect upon illegal immigration of a grant of EVD could be
enormous. To, in effect, invite anyone to come to the United States from such
a country might stimulate "an ever-growing influx of economic migrants."
W. Scott Burke, Compassion Versus Self-Interest: Who Should Be Given Asylum in the United
States?, 8 FLETCHER F. 311, 328 (1984) (quoting Elliott Abrams, Diluting Compassion,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 1983), http://www.nytimes.com/1983/08/05/opinion/diluting-
compassion.html).
95. See Bergeron, supra note 92, at 29 (discussing the legislative history that
indicates a clear goal of a temporary program that can provide a safe haven).
96. See generally ARGUETA, supra note 84, at 9-10 (observing that there has been a
consistent rationale in continuing to re-designate various Central American countries,
including Nicaragua and El Salvador, for "substantial, but temporary, disruption of
living conditions" in those countries).
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were largely effective. 97 Despite that, TPS has been renewed for the three
worst-affected countries ever since, on the premise that the countries
are unable to "handle the return of its nationals adequately." ' Whatever
the justifications, such consistent renewals have provoked ire among
immigration restrictionists, who decry TPS as a back-door "amnesty." 99
Lurking under the extensions and re-designations are complex
foreign policy issues. With each of the countries whose TPS
designation has lasted the longest-Liberia, Honduras, El Salvador,
and Nicaragua-the United States has had unusually close and/or
fraught relations. The United States founded Liberia, and Liberian
elites, usually American-Liberian, have long had a close affinity to the
United States.0 The United States has also historically had a complex
relationship with Central America. The U.S. role in the region in the
1980s is inextricably linked to the refugee waves fleeing civil war during
that time; more recently, the United States' deportation of gang-
members has had a devastating impact, becoming the root cause of
current migration from the region.101 Also, for all four countries,
97. See, e.g., JOSHUA LICHTENSTEIN, OXFAM AM., AFTER HURRICANE MITCH: UNITED
STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT RECONSTRUCTION AND THE
STOCKHOLM PRINCIPLES 1-5 (2001), http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf docs/Pcaab248.pdf;
Survivors of Hurricane Mitch Have Rebuilt Their Lives, INT'L FED'N OF THE RED CROSS (Oct.
22, 2008), http://www.ifrc.org/en/nouvelles/nouvelles/common/survivors-of-
hurricane-mitch-have-rebuilt-their-lives; Ten Years After Hurricane Mitch, Honduras is
Once Again Hit by Natural Disaster, UNICEF (Oct. 27, 2008),
http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/honduras-45850.html.
98. USCIS TPS, supra note 90.
99. Temporary Protected Status, FED'N FOR AM. IMMIGR. REFORM (Jan. 31, 2016),
https: //fairus.org/issue /legal-immigration/ temporary-protected-status.
100. Id. (showing the back and forth justifications and terminations between
administrations of the TPS for Liberians).
101. Because of the involvement of the United States in Central America,
[t]he United States also bears responsibility to reform and enhance existing
policies because Central American states are highly sensitive to a number of
U.S. policy decisions that have direct effects on their welfare. These include
immigration and trade as well as the approach to illicit drugs, money
laundering, and the illegal southward flow of arms. The American demand
for drugs, which has remained consistently high, buttresses the case for
increased U.S. responsibility. The often unhappy history of U.S. intervention
in countries such as Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador is yet another
argument for a more constructive posture. Regardless of the past, U.S. officials
regard the current situation in Central America as of critical concern to U.S.
national security, although a sense of moral obligation should inform and
contextualize current policy thinking.
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emigrant populations in the United States have become forceful
advocates for extensions. Part II further examines the extent to which
these various factors should be considered.
For immigrant advocates, the lack of temporariness means that
people who have steadily integrated into life in the United States have
no "on-ramp" to fuller legal and political inclusion. As Claire Bergeron
has written,
[E]xtended grants of TPS run contrary to the policy goals of
fostering integration and full membership within American society
for long-term residents. Lacking many of the benefits that come
with [lawful permanent resident] status, long-term TPS beneficiaries
effectively find themselves locked in 'legal limbo' as defacto members
of American society who are offered less than full membership.
10 2
Bergeron proposes that after ten years, TPS recipients could seek to
adjust status to permanent residence. 103 Such a concept employs
Hiroshi Motomura's concept of immigration as transition, and has
deep historical analogs. One example of this in practice is the United
States Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS) revelation that for
the Central American Minor (CAM) program, TPS was by far "the
immigration status held by the largest percentage of petitioning
Qualifying Parents-approximately eighty-nine percent."104 The
inclusion of TPS among the qualifying statuses is correct as a legal
matter, but it also shows how the liminal status is the basis for a slightly
elevated claim on the United States.
Despite these unresolved internal contradictions between unmet
intent and unintended consequences, some advocates have pushed for
a new TPS program to respond to current Central American
violence.10 TPS provides an interesting set of opportunities and
MICHAEL SHIFTER, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, COUNTERING CRIMINAL VIOLENCE IN
CENTRAL AMERICA 4 (2012), https://www.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2012/03/
CriminalViolenceCSR64.pdf.
102. Bergeron, supra note 92, at 29; see also Keyes, supra note 48, at 123 (providing
the example of DREAMers who, by way of the DREAM Act, would have been given a
path to citizenship, if they met certain qualifications).
103. Bergeron, supra note 92, at 39.
104. OMBUDSMAN, U.S. DEP'T. OF HOMELAND SEC., ANNUAL REPORT 2016:
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES 18 (2016) [hereinafter DHS OMBUDSMAN
REPORT], https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/DHS%20Annual
%20Report%202016.pdf.
105. See Suzanne Gamboa, Hundreds of Groups Press for Temporary Protection for Central
Americans, NBC NEWS (Jan. 25, 2016, 10:42 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/
latino/more-200-groups-press-temporary-protection-central-americans-n503786;
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warnings for the possibility of using a broad-scale, administratively
simple option for Central American migrants today. As compared to
the CAA's goals, TPS scores favorably on administrative efficiency,
foreign relations, and providing refuge. It scores poorly on
integration, as it provides no path to permanence and full integration,
no matter how long the individual with TPS holds that status.
D. Other Nationality-Based Protection Programs
The United States has a lengthy history of providing country-specific
immigration routes based on the political conditions of certain
countries. There have long been programs to permit "in-country
processing," or application for a humanitarian immigration benefit
before leaving the home country, including programs in Vietnam,
Cuba, Haiti, and Iraq,1"6 and most recently the CAM Program.0 7 The
Migration Policy Institute studied these programs in its 2015 report, In-
Country Processing: A Piece of the Puzzle.108 From this, it is clear that such
programs have always shared concerns with (1) the orderliness of
migration as a rule of law matter; (2) the need to prevent dangerous
forms of migration; (3) the need for administratively efficient forms of
protection; and (4) consistency with foreign policy objectives-familiar
themes found, to different extents, in both the CAA and TPS.10 9
The very name of the Vietnam program-the Orderly Departure
Program' 1 0-demonstrates the rule of law preoccupation. The
program emerged to reduce the foreign policy embarrassment of the
large numbers of "boat people" fleeing post-war Vietnam. At first, the
Vietnam program applied, for administrative simplicity, to any
Vietnamese person whose refugee status was simply presumed. This
Advocacy Letter from Refugees Int'l et al. to President Barack Obama (Jan. 25, 2016),
https://www.refugeesinternational.org/ advocacy-letters-1/2016/2/1 /northern-
triangle-temporary-protected-status-national-letter.
106. See FAYE HIPSMAN & DORIS MEISSNER, MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE, IN-COUNTRY
PROCESSING IN CENTRAL AMERICA: A PIECE OF THE PUZZLE, 10-11 (2015),
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/In-Countr-
Processing-FINALWEB.pdf.
107. In-County Refugee/Parole Processing for Minors in Honduras, El Salvador and
Guatemala (Central American Minors - CAM), U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES,
https://www.uscis.gov/CAM (last updated Aug. 16, 2017). [hereinafter CAM
Guidance].
108. HIPSMAN & MEISSNER, supra note 106, at 9-11.
109. Id. at 12-13.
110. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REFUGEE PROGRAM: THE ORDERLY DEPARTURE
PROGRAM FROM VIETNAM 2 (1990), http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbatI0/141353.pdf.
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broad eligibility criterion narrowed as the years went on-presumably
as the capacity to do more individualized determinations increased.
Cuban in-country processing likewise evolved, but in an expansive
way as foreign relations with Cuba remained stalemated.1 11 Originally
for political prisoners, in-country processing expanded to also cover
(1) former political prisoners; (2) members of persecuted religious
minorities; (3) human rights activists; (4) forced labor conscripts
during the period 1965 to 1968; (5) persons deprived of their
professional credentials or subjected to other disproportionately
harsh or discriminatory treatment resulting from their perceived or
actual political or religious beliefs; and (6) others who appear to
have a credible claim that they will face persecution as defined in the
1951 UN Convention on Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.
112
It is worth emphasizing here that these categories exceeded the
protections of the Refugee Convention-such as those facing
discrimination or deprivation of credentials-and that the refugee
definition is used only as a catch-all for those who do not fit into the
other categories. This, then, is a time the U.S. government has gone
beyond the refugee definition in its identification of individuals
qualifying for refugee status. For Cubans, the refugee definition was a
floor, not a ceiling, for the availability of protection.
The CAM Program is the most recent entrant to this category of
options. CAM, available to Northern Triangle countries only, emerged
in late 2014 in response to one of the Obama Administration's public
justifications for its harsh deterrent message to Northern Triangle
migrants.1 1 3 When the migrants, and especially the children, began
crossing in larger numbers in 2014, the Administration quickly stated
that its opposition was grounded in fear for the safety of children
crossing Mexico into the United States: "[W] e are working with our
Central American partners, nongovernmental organizations, and
other influential voices to send a clear message to potential migrants
111. Note that in-country processing, meaning the acquisition of status before
leaving the home country, is in addition to the protections of the CAA discussed in
Section IA, supra.
112. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON PROPOSED REFUGEE
ADMISSIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1995 24 (1994), http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/
population/ 1995_Refugee-report.html (naming the new priority categories for
Cuban in-country refugee processing).
113. See HIPSMAN & MEISSNER, supra note 106, at 1-3.
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so that they understand the significant dangers of this journey and
what they will experience in the United States." '114
Months later the Administration created CAM in response to these
concerns. The program allows those eligible to apply for status "in-
country" before embarking on any journey to the United States. The
CAM website bills the program as providing "a safe, legal, and orderly
alternative to the dangerous journey that some children are currently
undertaking to the United States.""1 The 2016 USCIS Ombudsman's
Report to Congress also described the purposes as helping "children
avoid this dangerous trip north by affording them an in-country
process for safe relocation."1 6
The program exists for children who meet the refugee definition
and who already have a qualifying parent in the United States. 17 The
qualifying parent must have some form of status, from permanent
residence to the more liminal statuses of deferred action or parole.1
Very few have applied because of the requirement that the qualifying
relative have legal status.11 9 And even among those who applied, the
State Department has interviewed very few: a year after the program was
launched, the State Department had interviewed only 90 of 3955
applicants.120 A few months later, by April 2016, 197 parents and children
had entered the United States through the program.1 21 Most (fifty-
114. Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Sec'y, Letter from the
President-Efforts to Address the Humanitarian Situation in the Rio Grande Valley
Areas of Our Nation's Southwest Border (June 30, 2014),
https: //www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office /2014/ 06/ 30 letter-president-efforts-
address-humanitarian-situation-rio-grande-valle.
115. CAM Guidance, supra note 107.
116. DHS OMBUDSMAN REPORT, supra note 104, at 17-18.
117. An in-country parent might also qualify, if the parent meets the refugee
definition as well. See CAM Guidance, supra note 107.
118. Id.
119. See id. ("Only certain parents who are lawfully present in the United States are
eligible to be qualifying parents and request access to the program for their children.").
120. Elise Foley, A Program Meant to Keep Kids from Coming to the U.S. Illegally Hasn't
Let Anyone in Legally Yet, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 28, 2015, 6:25 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/central-american-minor-refugee-program us
563138cfe4b063179910c855.
121. Molly Hennessy-Fiske, Frustrated by New U.S. Program to Take in Migrants, Central





seven percent) entered with humanitarian parole, not refugee status, which
linits their ability to achieve lawful permanent residence and citizenship.122
The U.S. government itself recognized the limitations of the
program.
While the 7357 [relative affidavits] received by March 21, 2016 signal
a marked increase in program participation, the sustained number
of [unaccompanied alien children] arrivals from the Northern
Triangle to the southern U.S. border demonstrates that broader
protections are needed.
123
As a result, the State Department announced inJanuary 2016 that it
would work with the office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees ("UNHCR") to bolster in-country refugee processing in
the Northern Triangle, and some of those determined to be refugees
would go to the United States, and some to other countries. 124 In July
2016, the Obama Administration announced a few of the details of this
new initiative to help address forced migration from the Northern
Triangle.12 s While the Trump Administration has halted the CAM
program, it is unclear as of this writing whether the new State
Department initiative will go forward as planned. 126 It is nonetheless
worth examining what the shape of the initiative was to look like.
The plan was to do the initial screening within the Northern
Triangle countries, including security screening, and then once
processed, to use Costa Rica as a temporary site for those awaiting
acceptance as refugees in the United States orin other countries willing
to accept them.127 Costa Rica and the United States entered into a
"protection transfer agreement" with UNHCR and the International
122. Id. (discussing that those under CAM the program cannot apply for citizenship
and must renew their application every two years).
123. DHS OMBUDSMAN REPORT, supra note 104, at 20.
124. Press Release, U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, U.S. Announcement on
Central America Refugees Highlights Seriousness of Situation (Jan. 14, 2016),
http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/press/2016/1/5697d35f6/announcement-
central-america-refugees-highlights-seriousness-situation.html.
125. See Julie Hirschfeld Davis, U.S. to Admit More Central American Refugees, N.Y.
TIMES (July 26, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/27/us/politics/obama-
refugees-central-america.html.
126. David Nakamura, Trump Administration Ends Obama-Era Protection Program for




127. Id. (discussing the procedures for security screening in the applicant's native
country).
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Organization for Migration.128 Under that agreement, the migrants
would only go to Costa Rica-two hundred at a time-once security
screening had happened in their home-countries, a process that takes
months or years in other refugee settings, such as camps for Syrian
refugees in Egypt or Lebanon.
129
In-country processing has been criticized as an "exception [that] is
seriously in danger of swallowing the rule."1' 0 One piece of the
Convention definition of a refugee is that the person is outside the
country of origin; in-country processing removes that requirement
procedurally, as a way of providing assurance that once an individual
is outside the country of origin, they will have legal status. Another
critique of in-country processing, most specifically the CAM program,
is the danger it creates for prospective beneficiaries who must wait in
dangerous circumstances before a decision is made."' Depending on
the level of immediate danger, the wait may be a disincentive for
availing of in-country processing, and create an incentive for disorderly
migration for the purpose of seeking asylum at the U.S. border.
Regardless of the critiques, these programs do reveal a precedent in
U.S. law that views people in broad categories of need. In-country
processing, TPS, and country-specific refugee protections such as the
CAA and Lautenberg Amendment cases, share a common goal of
responding efficiently to either emerging or long-standing migration
problems, and they all presume, to varying extents, a general
underlying reason for the migration problem that is worth a response,
while de-emphasizing heavily individualized determinations of the
kind required by our asylum process, described in Section III.C, infra.
Their benefits range from extremely valuable (permanent residence
for Cubans) to liminal (TPS) to procedural (in-country processing).
They thus demonstrate not only that broad protection has a rich
128. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec. Press Office, U.S. Expands
Initiatives to Address Central American Migration Challenges (July 26, 2016),
https: //www.dhs.gov /news /2016 /07 /26 /us-expands-initiatives-address-central-
american-migration-challenges.
129. See Amanda Holpuch, US Partners with Costa Rica to Protect Central American
Refugees, GUARDIAN (July 26, 2016, 1:23 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2016/jul/26/central-american-refugees-costa-rica-obama-administration.
130. Raufer, supra note 78, at 236.
131. Donald Kerwin, The U.S. Refugee Protection System on the 35th Anniversaly of the
Refugee Act of1980, 3J. ON MIGRATION & HUM. SECURITY 205, 206-08 (2015) [hereinafter
Kerwin, 35th Anniversay of the Refugee Act of 1980].
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history within U.S. immigration law, but also that there is considerable
flexibility in its design and extent.
II. JUSTIFYING BROADER PROTECTION: WHAT DUTY TO THE STRANGER?
Having demonstrated that broad protection is possible in many
forms, the Article turns to the essential question of why it is necessary.
One answer is offered by the quote with which the Article begins: "We
can park our chair on the beach as often as we please, and cry at the
oncoming waves, but the tide will not listen, nor the sea retreat. "132
This Section begins with an exploration of this simple, pragmatic idea
that doing nothing is an option unavailable to us. Because such an
answer is compelling, but incomplete and unsatisfying, the Section
continues by addressing the question of necessity with an exploration
of deeper philosophical justifications for some level of duty to the
"stranger" in our midst, a hotly contested idea in political philosophy.
A. Contrasting Views
133
As noted above, a common theme in response to forced migrations
is that articulated by President Trump when he was campaigning.
Asked about helping Syrian refugees, he responded, "I'd love to help.
But we have our own problems. 1 3' 4 Leaving aside the argument that
this may be a false choice and that helping both populations could be
possible, the quote names an intuition that has roots in a deep
philosophical debate: to whom do we owe duties? To our fellow
citizens? To the stranger? To both in an equal degree, or in varying
degrees? This debate is at least as old as the Greeks, where
cosmopolitans contested the unique focus on the polis. This Section
focuses on how those debates have evolved in the modern era.
132. BAUMAN, supra note 1, at 4-5 (quoting Robert Winter's view that mass
migration is not likely to stop in the near future).
133. A brief foray into the deep philosophical debates over duties to people outside
one's borders is both necessary and impossible. Fortunately, for those interested in
these debates, a wonderful collection of essays is available in THE ETHICS AND POLITICS
OF IMMIGRATION: CORE ISSUES AND EMERGING TRENDS (Alex Sager ed., 2016)
[hereinafter ETHICS AND POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION].
134. Ian Hanchett, Trump on Refugees: I'd Love to Help but We Have Our Own Problems,
BREITBART (Sept. 9, 2015), http://www.breitbart.com/video/2015/09/09/trump-on-
refugees-id-love-to-help-but-we-have-our-own-problems.
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1. Justifying the right to exclude
Numerous philosophers find justification for prioritizing, perhaps
exclusively, our fellow citizens. In his seminal Spheres ofJustice, Walzer
considers that the right to exclude foreigners is a critical component
of the right to self-determination for a community-the nation-state."'
In a succinct summary of his position, Amy Reed-Sandoval writes,
"According to Walzer, the value and very nature of the goods that get
distributed in political communities"-here, note the echoes of
Trump's statement about helping our own people-"is necessarily
determined by the members of which these communities are
comprised."1 "6 Walzer thus believes that membership is a "good that
can be distributed" to be "determined by the existing members of the
community."17 As applied to debates of migration in the United
States, the idea here is that members of the United States polity-
defined by citizenship-should be determining who shares in the
polity's resources (including membership itself). As far as this goes, it
simply reflects what is politically true, even in contentious times,
namely that migration is a proper subject for legislation and national
action, and is subject to limitations as defined by those laws and actions.
Finally, other philosophers have spoken of the right of communities
to preserve culture or choose the pace of cultural change. David Miller
articulates this, writing that people want to be able to shape the way
that their nation develops, including the values that are contained in
the public culture. They may not of course succeed: valued cultural
features can be eroded by economic and other forces that evade
political control. But they may certainly have good reason to try, and
in particular to try to maintain cultural continuity over time, so that
they can see themselves as the bearers of an identifiable cultural
tradition that stretches backward historically." 8
This idea of the value of cultural preservation certainly animates part
of the current immigration debates in the United States, the part
expressed when people say "go back to where you came from" to those
135. WALZER, supra note 33, at 39.
136. Amy Reed-Sandoval, The New Open Borders Debate, in ETHICS AND POLITICS OF
IMMIGRATION, supra note 133, at 15.
137. Id.
138. Christopher Heath Wellman, Immigration, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL.,
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/immigration/#PolSelDet (last updated Mar. 23,
2015) (quoting David Miller, a proponent of closed borders, to explain why some




perceived as other (oftentimes regardless of whether they came from
another country or were born in the United States). Cultural
preservation can, in such circumstances, conflate with racism and
xenophobia, and is critiqued as a consequence. Apart from
preservation, there may equally be a concern, removed from both
racism and xenophobia, about wishing, for example, to keep a
democratic culture-a culture that increasingly embraces women's
rights, or the rights of people of varying sexual orientations. This
philosophical justification for closed borders is agnostic about the
content of the culture being preserved (or reasons animating
preservation), but acknowledges culture as a value sufficient to justify
the idea of exclusion.3 9
However, even these various proponents of whatJoseph Carens calls
"bounded justice" recognize some level of duty to those beyond
borders. Carens, who first powerfully articulated a philosophical
defense of open borders, provides a nuanced articulation of those who
find that "freedom of movement, equality of opportunity and
distributive justice are not moral principles that transcend borders."'14
He sees how proponents of bounded justice "do not deny that we have
some moral duties to people outside our political community .... For
example, they usually acknowledge that we have a duty to address the
plight of refugees, at least in part by admitting some of them.
1 41
Overall, however, he characterizes this view as one where
[t]here may be very significant differences between states in terms
of the life chances that they offer their inhabitants, but this fact does
not give rise to any strong moral claim for assistance from better off
states to those less well off, or to a right for people to move from one
state to another where prospects are better.
1 42
It is this lack of a strong moral claim that Carens addresses in his body
of work, described briefly below.
2. Justifying opening borders
The chief case for acknowledging duties to those beyond our
national borders comes from the work of Carens, but his work builds
from the writing ofJohn Rawls. In A Theory ofJustice, Rawls argues that
fair principles of justice depend on devising those principles from
139. Reed-Sandoval, supra note 136, at 15-17.
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behind a "veil of ignorance."143 Without knowing whether you were
favored or disfavored in the society you were building (in terms of
wealth or ability or other factors), what principles would be most likely
to advance your interests?144 Whatever principles people would agree
to without knowing their standing in society are likely to be fair. He
concludes that two principles would emerge. One would guarantee
"equal basic rights and liberties needed to secure the fundamental
interests of free and equal citizens and to pursue a wide range of
conceptions of the good. ' ' 4' The other demands equality of opportunity.
1 46
Carens, in his seminal work Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open
Borders,14 7 considered Rawls's arguments on a global level: would one
choose borders if, a priori, one had no idea whether one would be born
in a wealthy and/or free society versus a repressive and/or poor
society? Using the "original position" view and emphasizing Rawls's
veil of ignorance, borders act as modern "feudal birthright privileges,"
locking citizens of certain countries into relative privilege and citizens
of other countries into poverty and danger.1 4 1 Carens argues therefore
that borders do not meet the test set forth by Rawls. While an extreme
idea in modern international relations, important examples do exist
internationally and within countries. One is the European Union,
which is being severely tested by the freedom of movement across
countries within itsjurisdiction.149 The other is the United States itself,
which upholds free movement across state borders in its Constitution. °
Whatever the validity of these philosophical arguments, open
borders are simply not part of our political discourse on migration.
While useful for establishing a moral and justice-oriented critique of
borders, any contribution to a political conversation must accept the
validity of borders. The next Section looks to ethical viewpoints on the
space between bounded justice and open borders, and provides a
143. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OFJUSTICE 11 (Harvard Univ. Press rev. ed. 1999).
144. Id.




147. Joseph Carens, Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders, 49 REV. POL. 251,
252 (1987).
148. Id. at 252, 255.
149. Vince Cable, Why it's Time to End EU Free Movement, NEW STATESMAN (Jan. 4,
2017), http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/uk/2017/01/why-its-time-end-eu-
free-movement.
150. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
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philosophical justification for broader protection, while permitting
that protection to be bounded.
B. Middle Ground: Duties to the Sojourner and to Those in Need
There is a range between immigration control that denies all rights
and completely open borders with strong incentives for migration.
This Article adopts such a position: a pragmatic understanding of the
significance of borders with limitations on the power of immigration
control to deny fundamental rights. The middle ground between
bounded justice and open borders is sometimes labeled moderate or
weak cosmopolitanism. Acknowledging that we are citizens of both
our nations and the world, this philosophy privileges duties owed to
co-nationals, but recognizes a lesser set of duties that may yet be owed
to non-nationals, such as these forced migrants.
Immanuel Kant trod this middle ground, famously writing, "A visitor
must not be treated in a hostile manner due to her arrival on the soil
of another individual. The original inhabitant may, however, expel
her, 'if it can be done without [her] ruin."' '""l Kant's position is
oftentimes described as a variation of "moderate cosmopolitanism"
that sees us as both citizens of the world, a source of our duties to the
stranger, and citizens of our own locality. In this view, peace in the
world depends on respecting the human rights of both groups.
152
Since Kant, a tradition of "moral philosophers and moralists in the
wake of eighteenth-century cosmopolitanisms have insisted that we
human beings have a duty to aid fellow humans in need, regardless of
their citizenship status. ' ' a Philosophers like Seyla Benhabib have
inhabited this interesting area, finding value in borders, but
articulating the need for "porous [ness]" of those borders. 1 4  This
Section considers two possible justifications for strategic porousness
and contemplates the strongest argument against such strategies.
151. Gregor Noll, Why Refugees Still Matter: A Response to James Hathaway, 8 MELB.J.
INT'L L. 536, 545 (2007) (quoting Immanuel Kant's view on the right of hospitality for
a global citizen).
152. Pauline Kleingeld, Cosmopolitanism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL.,
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cosmopolitanism (last updated July 1, 2013).
153. Id. (discussing the obligation of helping others in need and the history of
international organizations serving those in need).
154. See SEYLA BENHABIB, THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS: ALIENS, RESIDENTS, AND CITIZENS
88 (2004).
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1. A "causal connection" carve-out
One source of duty relevant to unconventional refugees is the role
of the receiving state in creating the harm that individuals are fleeing.
Philosopher Shelley Wilcox, a cosmopolitan, has set forth an
approach-the global harm principle-which critiques aspects of the
Carens open borders viewpoint. She argues that if one pragmatically
accepts the premise that immigration controls may bejustified in some
cases, then there must be a principle for deciding whom states admit
or reject."' 5 Her principle articulates a state's duty to compensate those
whom the state's conduct has harmed,"6 defining harm as either "a
setback to a person's basic welfare interests" or as "a human rights
deficit.' ' 117 Per this argument, those harmed should be prioritized in
terms of admissions. Joseph Carens agrees that even for those who
disagree with his ultimate conclusions about the lack of moraljustifications
for borders, there is this special duty where there is some causal
connection. He writes, "Sometimes we have an obligation to admit
refugees because the actions of our own state have contributed in some way
to the fact that the refugees are no longer safe in their home country." '' s
Consideration of causal connections has particular relevance in the
situation of migrants fleeing Central America, whose migration arises
from a specific historical context with American roots. U.S.
government support of violent regimes in El Salvador, Guatemala, and
Honduras led directly to huge levels of migration from those countries;
to this day, those countries also possess extremely weak governing
institutions. By contrast, Nicaragua's history of self-determination-
followed by its strong performance in providing security to its
citizens-has resulted in lower migration numbers"59 The war on
155. Shelley Wilcox, Immigrant Admissions and Global Relations of Harm, 38 J. Soc.
PHIL. 274, 274-75 (2007).
156. Id. at 279 (clarifying that the state's conduct must have been a "critically
necessary causal factor" in the harm).
157. Id.
158. CARENS, supra note 35, at 195.
159. See WILLIAM M. LEoGRANDE, OUR OwN BACKYARD: THE UNITED STATES IN
CENTRALAMERICA, 1977-1992 505-30 (1998) (offering a comprehensive history of U.S.
foreign policy toward Central America during the waning years of the Cold War that
ultimately shaped the region's destiny); see also Arturo J. Viscarra & Michael Prentice,
Children of the Monroe Doctrine: The Militarized Roots of America's Border Calamity,
ALTERNET (Aug. 11, 2014, 11:12 AM), http://www.alternet.org/immigration/
children-monroe-doctrine-militarized-roots-americas-border-calamity (arguing that
the influx of Central American refugees to the United States can be traced back to the
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drugs, rise in gangs, and exportation of gangs to the Northern Triangle
are modern actions that implicate the United States in the instability
and insecurity of the region.160
One need only contemplate that the term used to describe the gangs
of Central America, maras, comes from the streets of Los Angeles,
and that the rise of Central American gangs was precipitated by U.S.
law enforcement policies that deported convicted gang members
even when their lives and criminal histories had been shaped in the
[United States] .161
Acknowledging this context helps lift any policy responses-from
protection to work on root causes-out of the realm of noblesse oblige,
with the United States as a savior 162 of the Northern Triangle charity-
cases, and into a relationship of mutual obligation and, as developed
in the next Section, shared interest. 16 The broader historical context
provides additional justification for an elevated U.S. role in providing
meaningful refuge for these migrants. It also offers a principled reason
why this migration situation might differ from others in the future,
where the connection to U.S. policies is more attenuated.
Matthew Lister is also attuned to the importance of context. In his
work, he disaggregates forced migration into those who are admitted
pursuant to the Refugee Convention, which requires a finding of
persecution because of one of the Convention's protected grounds,
1980s when the U.S. military financed, armed, and trained pro-U.S. rebel groups in El
Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala).
160. See Eyder Peralta, Central American Presidents Say U.S. Shares Responsibility for
Migration Crisis, NPR (July 24, 2014, 2:38 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/ 2014/07/ 24/334942174/ central-american-presidents-say-u-s-shares-
responsibility-for-migration-crisis (explaining that when the United States drove
violent organized crime out of Colombia and Mexico, organized crime groups
transferred some of their activity into Central America).
161. Chantal Thomas, Transnational Migration, Globalization, and Governance:
Reflections on the Central America - United States Immigration Crisis 2 (Cornell L. Sch. Res.
Paper No. 14-26, 2014), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-
id 2491308#-#.
162. For insight into this problematic construct, see Makau Mutua, Savages, Victims,
and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights, 42 HARV. INT'L L.J. 201, 219 (2001).
163. See Ramji-Nogales, supra note 25, at 619 (explaining that Central American
migrants have overwhelmingly characterized their migration as a "crisis," devoid of
context: "[I]n the long-term, the use of the label 'crisis' obscures long-term systemic
causes of situations of vulnerability and peril, framing them instead as isolated
incidents that somehow snuck up on us."). When discussing the cartel violence in the
Northern Triangle, the desire for drugs in American is often ignored. Id. Rather than
long-term institutions, emergency rhetoric centers around temporary crisis solutions.
Id. at 624.
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and those who flee more generalize violence.1 64 Importantly, he
connects the nature of harm experienced with the nature of protection
afforded by the receiving state. He writes, "the best way to understand
the normative point of refugee protection (or the logic of the
[R]efugee [C]onvention) is to see that it provides a particularly
weighty remedy that is only appropriate when certain special sorts of harm
are faced. ' ' 6 ' Professor Lister understands that the remedy, which
usually entails full membership, or a road to full membership, is highly
valuable, just as Walzer posits. And he notes that it is "appropriate
when the harm faced is serious, when it is not plausibly expected to be
of short term duration, and where other means of addressing the
problem are not plausible." '16 6
Lister uses these factors to provide justification for granting asylum
to those fleeing harms where state authority has been usurped by
persecutory actors, such as the criminal gangs in the Northern
Triangle. 6 7 But these same factors do permit a limiting principle for
asylum, that it would not be available to all those fleeing difficult
environments. By implication, in such circumstances, the plausible
"other means" of addressing the problem, something short of the
weight remedy of asylum, would be appropriate. Again, through attention
to situational distinctions, political philosophy recognizes both some
level of duty to those beyond our borders, and some ability to differentiate
the level of duty owed depending on circumstances. This differentiation
is the focus of the framework suggested in Part IV of this Article.
2. Duties to the strangers already here
Another important differentiation amid debates about borders is the
differences between duties owed to persons at the border (where the
debate swings from rights of admission to sovereign rights to control
the border) and duties owed to persons within a state's borders. This
is another difficult debate; the importance of political self-
determination as a justification for borders, per Walzer's view, can be
164. Matthew Lister, The Place of Persecution and Non-State Action in Refugee Protection,
in ETHICSAND POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION, supra note 133, at 45, 47.
165. Id. at 48 (emphasis added).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 53-54 (providing three justifications for granting asylum when the state
has been usurped: (1) when rebel groups hold full control over the territory; (2) when
the state is unable to control the activities of gangs or oppose them, and the gangs
have countrywide reach; or (3) when the claimant is from a failed state without any
functioning government at all).
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impacted by the migration of people the state did not choose to
become members of its polity.168 As noncitizens cannot vote, and paths
to citizenship require assent by the state, this particular argument is
somewhat rebuttable. It is interesting to note, too, that migration
among the fifty U.S. states and the District of Columbia also
undermines the political self-determination of those jurisdictions, with
a constant stream of uninvited new members of the polity. However,
this is not generally perceived as problematic.169
Accepting, arguendo, that there is some impact on normatively
important political self-determination, the argument for progressive
inclusion of noncitizens has a strong, countervailing normative force.
As philosopher Onora O'Neill wrote in an early treatment of this topic,
"[T] oday questions of transnationaljustice will arise whether or not we
can find the theoretical resources to handle them."' 70 She describes a
world that is not one "of closed communities with mutually
impenetrable ways of thought, self-sufficient economies and ideally
sovereign states," and asks the question: "If complex, reasoned
communication and association breach boundaries, why should not
the demands ofjustice do so too?
1 71
Kant believed morality required, at minimum, hospitality to
sojourners-with the implication that "sojourn" signified a period of
168. See Walzer, supra note 33, at 40. Those people are variously called irregular
migrants, unauthorized migrants, and illegal immigrants. See CARENS, supra note 35,
at 129. I eschew all these terms because the vast majority of people who come under
the ambit of this Article's coverage used established, regular procedures to enter
(usually through the DHS's parole authority). Once their cases are decided, if the
migrants are unsuccessful and nonetheless remain, they would become
"unauthorized" immigrants. But for the duration of the process, there is nothing
particularly illegal, irregular, or unauthorized. "Uninvited" is a better description.
169. Indeed, some jurisdictions permit noncitizens to vote in local elections. See,
e.g., Voting by Nonresidents and Noncitizens, NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Feb. 27,
2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/non-resident-and-
non-citizen-voting.aspx (providing the example that noncitizens in Takoma Park,
Maryland, have been voting in city elections since 1993). By contrast, however,
migration of "outsiders" does occasionally become a matter of local political
contention, even though it is fully legal. See, e.g., Kevin Sullivan, A Fortress Against Fear,
WASH. POST (Aug. 27, 2016), http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/national/
2016/08/27/a-fortress-against-fear (describing an increased flux of end of the world
"preppers" to the Pacific Northwest due to fear of government collapse and
socioeconomic turmoil).
170. ONORA O'NEILL, BOUNDS OFJUSTICE 117 (2000).
171. Id. at 121.
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limited duration. But as sojourners spend more time in a polity, and
develop ties, the moral arguments likewise evolve. Carens writes:
Even if we accept the state's right to control immigration as a basic
premise, that right is not absolute and unqualified. Over time an
irregular migration status becomes morally less relevant while the
harm suffered by the person in that status grows. The state's right
to deport irregular migrants weakens as the migrants become
members of society.
1 72
For "irregular migrants" in particular, Carens sees that "the passage
of time also generates membership claims for irregular migrants" and
"[t]ime is the crucial variable."'1 73  Residence provides a useful,
administratively simple proxy for harder-to-measure connectedness;
Carens notes that with time comes "a dense network of relationships
and associations" which approximate what we mean by membership.
174
Carens acknowledges the difficulty of finding a bright line before
which membership claims are weak, and after which they are strong,
but ends at the somewhat arbitrary period of five years, a period the
framework in Part IV, infra, also adopts (also somewhat arbitrarily).17a
Five years is a number seen throughout U.S. immigration law, past
and present. In Americans in Waiting, Hiroshi Motomura has set forth
plentiful examples of the importance of time to immigration status and
membership claims, and even in an era of heightened immigration
restrictions, the period still shows up in the INA.1 76 For example,
contemporary green-card holders can naturalize after five years, 177 and
it is relevant to deportation whether a noncitizen's crime was
committed within the first five years of his or her presence in the
United States.1 7' Even for the undocumented, time matters. Those
without status who have been present ten years or more may benefit (if
other eligibility factors are met) from Cancellation of Removal, to receive
permanent residence at the conclusion of their deportation proceeding.
7 9
172. CARENS, supra note 35, at 157.
173. Id. at 145.
174. Id. at 164.
175. See id. at 104. Among the examples he considers are France and Spain, which
provided legal resident status if someone could document they had lived there 10 years
(France) or 5 years (Spain). Id. at 151.
176. HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION
AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 129 (2006).
177. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (2012).
178. § 1227(a) (2) (A) (i) (I).
179. § 1229b(b) (1).
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The ethical significance of time argues for programs like the CAA
and against TPS. While the CAA offers the enhanced rights after an
arguably too short period of time (one year), it effectively eliminates
immigration uncertainty and promotes integration, thus scoring
highly on the advancement of one group of immigrants as prospective
citizens. In contrast, TPS, which exists for many years with no likelihood
of enhanced rights after any period of time, ignores the ethical
arguments that Carens sets forth. In addition to the practical problems
this indefinite indeterminacy raises, described in Section I.C, supra, Carens
would criticize this as morally unjustifiable, as it ignores the very real
connections that longstanding residents-like those with TPS-have.
3. Incentives and deterrence
The response to these middle ground views, offering rights or
increasing levels of membership, is often that any aid offered to the
stranger creates an incentive for other strangers to arrive. This is
inevitably factually correct. Carens acknowledges this problem:
Every human right that is recognized as a legal right to which
irregular migrants are entitled can be seen as a cost to the receiving
state and as an incentive to more irregular migration. If the costs
and incentives are indeed substantial, this might provide reasons for
the state to be more diligent in pursuing morally permissible policies
for reducing unauthorized migration.
180
His argument continues, but first let us consider the truth of this
incentive problem.
The fear of opening the floodgates of migration is a phenomenon
with great staying power in immigration legal history. It forcefully
counters arguments about even our duty of non-refoulement, let alone
arguments for integration or broader temporary relief. In 1984,
Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights Elliott Abrams wrote,
"The policy they advocate, that anyone who gets here from El Salvador
be permitted to stay, would virtually invite an ever-growing influx of
economic migrants to the United States.""1 ' As prominent refugee
scholarJames Hathaway has written,
[R]ecent refugee migrations from the less developed world are
perceived to be destabilizing the cultural, racial, political, and
economic terms. "[T]he desire to help the world's poor and
oppressed clashes with the belief of most Americans that substantial
180. CARENS, supra note 35, at 138.
181. Abrams, supra note 94.
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immigration is undesirable and economically threatening to their
interests." The concern has thus shifted from the facilitation of
refugee movements to the deterrence of asylum-seekers.
182
Similar concerns were on vivid display with the Central American
refugees in 2014, as protestors tried to stop buses carrying children
from the border to temporary facilities,8 3 or protesting foster care
facilities deep in the interior.8 4 Opponents of the children's arrival in
the United States spoke of criminality, fiscal burdens, and the
lawlessness of illegal immigration."' s The numbers of unaccompanied
minors in 2014 were small relative to overall immigration: some 70,000
unaccompanied minors were apprehended in 2014186 compared to
1,016,518 receiving lawful permanent residence in FY 2014, and 180.5
182. James C. Hathaway, A Reconsideration of the Underlying Premise of Refugee Law, 31
HARV. INT'L LJ. 129, 169-70 (1990) (alteration in original) (citations omitted)
(quoting Burke, supra note 94, at 311).
183. See, e.g., Matt Hansen & Mark Boster, Protesters in Munrieta Block Detainees'Buses
in Tense Standoff L.A. TIMES duly 1, 2014, 9:39 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/
lanow/la-me-ln-immigrants-murrieta-2014070 1-storyi.html (describing a protest in
Murrieta, California where protestors blocked buses carrying unaccompanied minors
from Central America).
184. See, e.g., Halimah Abdullah, Not in My Backyard: Communities Protest Surge of
Immigrant Kids, CNN (July 16, 2014, 9:46 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/07/15/
politics/immigration-not-in-my-backyard (providing examples of protests across the
United States concerning housing for immigrant children); Sam Easter, Bay City
Commission Does Not Vote on Resolution Supporting Immigrant Children, but Protests Go on,
BAY CITY TIMES (Aug. 19, 2014, 2:44 AM), http://www.mlive.com/news/bay-city/
index.ssf/2014/08/bay-city-commission meetingse.html.
(reporting on protests over housing unaccompanied minors in Michigan); Samantha
Marcus, Dent Tours KidsPeace, Says Lack of Information Spurs Protests, MORNING CALL (Aug.
18, 2014, 11:30 PM), http://www.mcall.com/news/nationworld/mc-kidspeace-dent-
refugee-children-20140818-story.html (concerning similar protests in Allentown,
Pennsylvania).
185. See Hansen & Boster, supra note 183; see also Cindy Chang & Kate Linthicum,
U.S. Seeing a Surge in Central American Asylum Seekers, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2013),
http: //articles.latimes.com /2013 /dec /15 /local/la-me-ff-asylum-20131215/ 2
(reporting that fraud has been an issue in the underground asylum industry).
186. See Southwest Border Sectors: Family Unit and Unaccompanied Alien Children (0-17)
apprehensions FY 14 compared to FY 13, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PATROL,
https: //www.cbp.gov/ sites/ default/ files /documents /BP% 20Southwest%2OBorder%
20Family%2OUnits%20and%20UAC%2OApps%20FY13%20-%20FY14.pdf (last visited
Oct. 23, 2017) (providing that 113,039 people arrived to the U.S. southwest border
from Northern Triangle countries in FY 2014). During the same time period, a total
of 1.36 million migrants moved to the United States. Jie Zong & Jeanne Batalova,
Frequently Requested Statistics on Immigrants and Immigration in the United States,




million entering the United States on nonimmigrant visas.117
Nonetheless, the fact of them coming and the fact of their right to
enter the United States to seek asylum created a sense among many
that they were an unstoppable wave-indeed the primary word used to
describe the influx of migrants was a "surge." ' The "surge" led to
policies of disincentive or deterrence. Whether the present migration
from Central America fits this definition of a flood almost certainly
depends on one's perspective,"8 9 but it is also irrelevant to an
undeniable-not unchangeable, but presently undeniable-fact: the
migrants are coming. For a while in 2015, the numbers of people
arriving decreased. The Obama Administration credits this reduction
to a few strategies: (1) public information campaigns in Central America
discouraging migration; (2) the use of detention at the border as a
deterrent; and (3) cooperation with Mexico to intercept migrants at
Mexico's southern border. 90  The involvement of Mexico likely
accounts for most of the lower numbers, while the first of these only
had some impact and the deterrent power of detention has been
widely questioned. Yet in 2016, the numbers rose again, a testament
to the enduring dynamics forcing migration from the region. 9 '
Despite a deterrent detention strategy, efforts to prevent migrants
from reaching our borders in the first place, and consistent messaging
about the dangers of the journey, these migrants needed safety and came
187. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2014YEARBOOKOF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS tbls. 1, 25
(2016), https: //www.dhs.gov /sites /default/ files /publications/ oisyb-2014.pdf.
188. See Muzaffar Chishti & Faye Hipsman, Increased Central American Migration to the
United States May Prove an EnduringPhenomenon, MIGRATION POL'Y INST. (Feb. 18, 2016),
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/increased-central-american-migration-
united-states-may-prove-enduring-phenomenon.
189. See sources cited supra note 186.
190. See Chishti & Hipsman, supra note 188 ("While apprehensions at the U.S.
border fell, apprehensions in Mexico rose significantly, suggesting that outflows from
Central America remained fairly stable throughout 2015; many migrants were
apprehended by Mexican authorities before reaching the U.S. border."). This policy
has been criticized as restricting migrants' protection under international law. See
GEO. L. HUM. RIGHTS INST., THE COST OF STEMMING THE TIDE: How IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT PRACTICES IN SOUTHERN MEXICO LIMIT MIGRANT CHILDREN'S ACCESS TO




191. See Chishti & Hipsman, supra note 188 ("Despite the fluctuations in flows, the
complex set of push and pull factors driving Central American migration has changed
very little since 2014.").
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to the United States. That being said, whether effective or not, deterrence
is clearly a policy tool available to minimize the incentive problem.
Philosophers explain the appeal of such deterrence strategies.
Zygmunt Bauman states,
They are embodiments of the collapse of order, a state of affairs in
which the relations between causes and effects are stable and so
graspable and predictable, allowing those inside a situation to know
how to proceed. Because they reveal these insecurities to us,
refugees are easily demonized. By stopping them on the other side
of our properly fortified borders, it is implied that we'll manage to
stop those global forces that brought them to our doors.
1 9 2
Likewise, Bauman sees deterrence as an attempt to re-establish our
sense of agency against uncontrollable forces:
[W] hile we can do next to nothing to bridle the elusive and faraway
forces of globalization, we can at least divert the anger they caused
us and go on causing, and unload our wrath, vicariously, on their
products, close to hand and within reach. This won't, of course,
reach anywhere near the roots of the trouble, but might relieve, at
least for a time, the humiliation of our helplessness and our incapacity
to resist the disabling precariousness of our own place in the world.
1 9 3
Appealing as border-oriented deterrence strategies 94 may be,
philosophers also push back against ethical acceptance of such
strategies. Carens sets forth a premise that the right to control
immigration is tempered by other fundamental rights, and that the
incentive problem does not provide sufficient justification to deny
them "general human rights."19'  Such legal rights, in Carens's
estimation, do increase the incentives for migrants to come (and at the
very least, a system lacking due process and fundamental fairness
would provide a disincentive to migration). The fears of deluge, and
the accompanying argument about the need for deterrence, are best
answered in the United States by the evolution of constitutional norms
recognizing some fundamental rights, even where those might create
an incentive for migration.
192. Brad Evans & Zygmunt Bauman, The Refugee Crisis is Humanity's Crisis, N.Y.
TIMES (May 2, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/02/opinion/the-refugee-
crisis-is-humanitys-crisis.html.
193. BAUMAN, supra note 1, at 17.
194. "Border-oriented" strategies, as opposed to "root cause-oriented" strategies,
are discussed in Part IV, infra.
195. CARENS, supra note 35, at 132.
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Indeed, the U.S. Constitution, as interpreted through more than a
century of case law, acknowledges that while noncitizens do not, in
many instances-particularly as concerns the immigration system
itself-have the same rights as citizens, the Constitution does protect
certain fundamental rights of all persons, and not just citizens." 6
Through cases like Plyler v. Doe'9 7 and the long series of cases affirming
noncitizens rights to due process and fundamental fairness, even in
their immigration removal hearings, the Court extends constitutional
protections to those within-and sometimes beyond-its borders.9
For instance, birthright citizenship has been criticized as providing a
tremendous incentive for illegal migration, and yet the Court's United
States v. Wong Kim Ark"'9 decision, recognizing birthright citizenship for
U.S.-born children of undocumented parents, stands.20 0  That the
Court upholds such rights means that as a practical matter, the United
States is at some degree of constitutional peace with the incentive
problem. Criticizing a policy or law as an incentive may therefore be
factually accurate, but not determinative of the rights owed to the
strangers at our door.
196. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982) ("Whatever his status under the
immigration laws, an alien is surely a 'person' in any ordinary sense of that term.
Aliens, even aliens whose presence in this country is unlawful, have long been
recognized as 'persons' guaranteed due process of law by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.") (citing Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212
(1953)). Geoffrey Heeren has studied the "wobbly compromise" made between those,
like the early Federalists, who favored excluding noncitizens from constitutional
rights, and those who, like the Jefferson Republicans, thought those subject to U.S.
jurisdiction had to come under the protection of the Constitution. Geoffrey Heeren,
Persons Who Are Not the People: The Changing Rights of Immigrants in the United States, 44
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 367, 377 (2013).
197. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
198. Professor Heeren has also critiqued how rights-based jurisprudence has
diminished in popularity, as agency skepticism and federalism arguments took center
stage. Heeren, supra note 196, at 397.
199. 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
200. Id. at 662. For an overview of U.S. birthright citizenship and an argument for
why it should continue, see Ediberto Roman & Ernesto Sagas, Birthright Citizenship
Under Attack: How Dominican Nationality Laws May Be the Future of U.S. Exclusion, 66 AM.
U. L. REv. 1383 (2017).
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III. JUSTIFYING BROADER PROTECTION: PRAGMATISM
"Historic notions of sovereignty have less real meaning in such
circumstances, even if they are often vociferously articulated on both
sides of the border. There is a stunning disconnect between
quotidian reality and our concepts, policies and rhetoric. We cannot
stop immigration by fiat nor can we easily avoid the impacts our
society has on our closest neighbors, and that they have on us. "201
Having established a situation that requires a response, and
developed a philosophical justification for a broader response, the
Article now turns to pragmatic reasons for doing things differently because
the world is not currently offering a satisfactory "do nothing" option.
Our current system meets none of the diverse goals it is trying to
attain, including promoting the rule of law, deterrence, administrative
efficiency, accuracy, and well-being. Too often, these goals are set in
opposition to each other, but when faced with goals that seem to
undermine each other, we can consider changing the contours of the
debate, lengthening or shortening the time-frame, or broadening or
narrowing the geographic scope of ideas. The case of Central American
migration shows how we can rethink these goals to reduce the tensions
among them, and generate options that better meet a variety of interests.
A. Deterrence: Short-Term Failures, Long-Term Possibilities
In the wake of Central American migration, the term "deterrence"
has taken on specific meanings and political shadings. It is short-hand
for efforts to prevent Central Americans from undertaking thejourney
to the United States, and it happens in two ways. First, a deterrent
policy advises migrants, prior to leaving, about the dangers of the
journey, and the low likelihood of ultimate legal success in the United
States. °2 Second, the deterrent policy leverages Mexican migration
authorities to stop migrants at Mexico's own southern border, to cut
201. Abraham F. Lowenthal, The Underlying Significance of Central American
Immigration, BROOKINGS INST. (Aug. 3, 2014), https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/
the-underlying-significance-of-central-american-immigration.
202. See, e.g., Valerie Hamilton, How the US is Trying to Deter Migrants from Central
America-with Music, PRI (July 17, 2014, 10:45 PM), https://www.pri.org/stories/2014-
07-17/how-marimba-beat-helping-us-border-patrol-deter-migrants-coming-border
(explaining that the United States is using print, television, and radio advertisements
with messages warning potential immigrants about the dangers of attempting to
migrate into the United States).
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down on the numbers reaching the United States,203 and uses
detention at the U.S. border as a further disincentive. 20 4 Deterrence is
thus set up as being at odds with protection.
This dichotomy, while factually descriptive of existing policies, need not
hold true. Consider the goals underlying meaningful deterrence:
supporting communities in the Northern Triangle to make those
communities safer for all, promoting the rule of law in the Northern
Triangle; creating opportunities for orderly migration pursuant to the rule
of law, and supporting the safety of the migrants themselves. Many of these
goals are long-term projects and considering deterrence in a long-term
context, rather than as it is presently, permits both sides of the political
spectrum to find points of agreement. It also supports the goals of many of
the migrants themselves, who do not wish to leave home or undertake this
voyage, but who see no option for themselves or their families.
Short-term deterrent measures, like the use of detention facilities
and increasing security at Mexico's southern border, have failed
because they do not address the root causes of why people choose to
leave their homes. 2 ' Numerous reports have shown epidemic levels of
violent crime in the three Northern Triangle countries, 2 °' and the gangs
203. See GEO. HUM. RTS. INST., supra note 190, at 17.
204. DHS has stated,
[A]s a result of our new emphasis on the security of the southern border, it
will now be more likely that you will be apprehended; it will now be more likely
that you will be detained and sent back; and it will now be more likely that
your hard-earned money to smuggle a family member to the United States will
be seized and will never reach its intended source.
Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Statement by Secretary Johnson
Regarding Today's Trip to Texas (Dec. 15, 2014),
https:/ /www.dhs.gov/news/2014/12/15 /statement-secretary-johnson-regarding-
today's-trip-texas.
205. Professor Rebecca Hamlin states,
It's a realistic recognition that actually deterrence policies don't work ....
They might work when someone's only motivation to migrate is economic, but
they really don't work-and this is consistently found all over the world-when
it comes to people who are fleeing what they believe to be potentially a life-or-
death situation.
Priscilla Alvarez, Obama s Last Attempt at Immigration Reform, ATLANTIC (Aug. 8, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/08/immigration-reform-central-
american-refugees/494948 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
206. See Dennis Stinchcomb & Eric Hershberg, Unaccompanied Migrant Childrenfrom
CentralAmerica: Context, Causes, and Responses 9 (Am. Univ. Ctr. for Latin Am. & Latino
Stud., Working Paper No. 7, 2014), https://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/
388113561.pdf (providing a chart with a list of violent crimes and the numbers of each
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responsible for much of the crime operate in an organized fashion
throughout the countries, reducing the effectiveness of an internal
relocation option. Moreover, while the dangers of the trip to the
United States are known, the imperative of leaving endemic violence
paired with the possibility of a successful trip overrides that danger. As
former U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) Commissioner
Doris Meissner stated, "The research that we do know about is that people
are very aware of the dangers, but they make the decision to try. "207
A meaningful deterrent strategy would reflect an understanding that
those root causes cannot change in the short-term and would require
a medium-to-long term strategy for success. This herculean task
demands serious, sustained investment in foreign aid 218 paired with
unprecedented commitment to improving governance and
accountability in the sending countries, which are notoriously corrupt
with entrenched elites who control both the political and economic
spheres of their respective countries. 2 9 Former Vice President Biden
addressed this conundrum, noting both the importance of addressing
such root causes and the political difficulties of doing so.
[Biden] lamented that domestic political concerns were preventing the
leaders of those nations, who came to the White House last month to
discuss the crisis, from taking the types of steps that Colombia has
taken to curb narcotics and corruption under a U.S. assistance
program known as Plan Colombia. "Central American governments
aren't even close to being prepared to make some of the decisions
the Colombians made, because they're hard," Biden said.210
Another piece of acknowledging the context goes even deeper than
foreign aid and encouraging governance reforms in the region:
acknowledging America's own role in the very conditions that fuel
crime occurring in the Northern Triangle region); Renwick, supra note 39 (providing
a chart detailing the high murder rates of Central America).
207. Hamilton, supra note 202 (internal quotation marks omitted).
208. See Robert Valencia, Does Central America Need a Marshall Plan?, WORLD POL'Y
(July 28, 2014, 2:52 PM), http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2014/07/28/does-
central-america-need-marshall-plan (arguing that if the United States adopted a
Central American funding plan like the Marshall Plan from World War II, the
economies of the region would stabilize, and the gangs would die out).
209. Renwick, supra note 39 (commenting that corruption, along with low tax
revenue in the Northern Triangle, has exacerbated gang violence and extortion issues
to the point that outside intervention is likely necessary to address the issues).
210. Associated Press, Biden on Minors at Border 'These are Our Kids,' DAILY MAIL




violence in these countries. Three phenomena in particular form this
troubling role. First, the United States played a destabilizing role in
the region in the 1980s, which is directly connected to the oligarchic,
nondemocratic, and unaccountable governance in those countries
today.21 1 Second, the United States is the destination for much of the
drug traffic that passes through the region from drug-producing
nations in South America. Third, U.S. deportation policy has had a
significant effect on the rise of transnational gangs in the region; the
gangs now destabilizing and terrorizing El Salvador, Guatemala, and
Honduras developed and strengthened in the United States.2 12 As
noted above, such causal connections may justify enhanced
responsibilities for the United States, even among those who favor a
communitarian approach.
B. Short-Term Well-Being
If past experience with international development and good
governance programs is a guide, any policies designed to address these
root causes will need a generation or more to flourish." If we admit
that deterrence is a long-term project, then the next question is what
to do in the short term. Again, we see that the status quo serves neither
the United States nor the migrants themselves. Because it is easy to see
how the migrants' interests would be served by broader protection, the
essay briefly addresses the far less intuitive claim that U.S. interests
would also be served by broader protection.
The first piece of this claim centers on the rule of law. Court delays
leave the migrants themselves in harmfful limbo, straining to find lawyers,
and perhaps not even having authorization to work while awaiting
court.1 ' The delays also pose challenges to the governments of the cities,
211. See LEOGRANDE, supra note 159, at 44-45.
212. See Sonja Wolf, Maras Transnacionales: Origins and Transformations of Central
American Street Gangs, 45 LATINAM. RES. REV. 256, 258 (2010).
213. See DOUGLAS FARAH & CARL MEACHAM, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L STUD.,
ALTERNATIVE GOVERNANCE IN THE NORTHERN TRIANGLE AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S.
FOREIGN POLICY: FINDING LOGIC WITHIN CHAOS 49-50 (2015), https://csis-
prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacyfiles/files/publication/150911 Farah_
AlternativeGovernanceWeb.pdf (deducing that previous U.S. led initiatives in
Central America can provide important insight into how the United States should
structure its future plans for the region).
214. See Molly Hennessy-Fiske, Immigration: 445,000 Awaiting a Court Date, Which
Might Not Come for 4 Years, L.A. TIMES (May 16, 2015, 4:40 PM),
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-immigration-court-delay-20150515-story.html
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counties, and states where the migrants live because their status may
affect their ability to work, pay taxes, access health insurance, and more.2 1
The second piece of the claim centers on public safety, specifically
the effect of uncertainty on gang recruitment, radicalization, and
violence. The slow pace of the immigration system means many of
those who will ultimately prevail live for years in the liminal space
between being enforcement priorities and possessing lawful
immigration status. This unsettling space pushes these migrants into
vulnerable employment situations, puts education beyond the reach of
many, and-for younger migrants-creates fertile ground for gang
recruitment and attendant public safety issues. 21 ' Former Homeland
Security Secretary Michael Chertoff commented that "when people do
qualify for asylum and are moved into host countries, there has to be a
process in place to integrate them, get them educated, make sure they
can find work so they become productive members of society and not
simply embittered clusters of people who are marginalized.
' 21 7
Communities benefit by promoting migrant well-being. Worldwide,
the costs of poor integration are on their most vivid display in Europe,
with the rise in terrorism committed by home-grown terrorists-
usually young people who feel alienated and without a meaningful
218connection to the society they live in. As a security response,
(explaining that the exceedingly large amount of immigration cases has caused delays
for hearings by an average of four years).
215. See Dustin Walsh, Green Card Delays Create Problemsfor Legal Immigrants, Employers,
CRAIN'S DETROIT Bus. (June 1, 2014, 12:00 PM), http://www.crainsdetroit.com/
article/20140601/NEWS/306019992/green-card-delays-create-problems-for-legal-
immigrants-employers (reporting that delays in issuing green cards is affecting
employers in hiring qualified immigrants, and immigrants are unable to secure home
loans and other policies while in liminal status).
216. For an in-depth analysis of the recent rise in gang-related violence in many
cities in the United States, see Hctor Silva Avalos, The MS13 Moves (Again) to Expand
on US East Coast, INSIGHT CRIME (Dec. 2, 2016), http://www.insightcrime.org/
investigations/msl3-moves-expand-us-east-coast. The phenomenon of Central
American gangs has traveled back and forth between the United States, where it
started, and Central America through deportations, with ongoing communications
between the two regions. See, e.g., CLARE RIBANDO SEELKE, CONG. RES. SERV., RL34112,
GANGS IN CENTRAL AMERICA 9 (Aug. 29, 2016),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34112.pdf (explaining that the deportations of
criminals to Central America has increased the region's gang problem).
217. Donald Kerwin, How Robust Refugee Protection Policies Can Strengthen Human and
National Security, 4 J. ON MIGRATION & HUM. SECURITY 83, 92 (2016) [hereinafter
Kerwin, Protection Policies Strengthen Security].
218. See, e.g.,John Wihbey & Leighton Walter Kille, France, Islam, Terrorism and the
Challenges of Integration: Research Roundup, JOURNALIST'S RESOURCE (Nov. 16, 2015),
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European nations are recognizing the need to address racial justice to
combat the rise in terrorism. Zygmunt Bauman writes powerfully
about the short-sightedness of demonizing refugees, instead of
building bridges to them:
Deceptively comfort-bringing (by chasing the challenge out of sight)
in the short run, such suicidal policies store up explosives for future
detonation.... [T]he sole way out of the present discomforts and
future woes leads through rejecting the treacherous temptations of
separation; .... Humanity is in crisis-and there is no exit from that
crisis other than solidarity of humans.
21 9
The World Economic Forum connected these migrant integration
issues with national security concerns, and urged stakeholders in migrant-
receiving countries to consider measures, such as "work permits and
access tojobs, skills recognition and training, and access to schools and
public health services. At the same time, at the global level, the
development community could help by focusing more strongly on
building resilience and helping refugees to transition into self-reliance. 220
The societal goods produced by integration are in tension, however,
with any vision of these migrants as temporary-a tension that is
impossible to resolve, but may be possible to reduce somewhat. The
approach suggested in Part IV, infra, offers protection of less value and
less permanence than the Refugee Convention provides, from concern
that something highly valuable and durable would add a large pull
factor to the push-factors driving migration now-and possibly
undermine the project of Northern Triangle safety. But the approach
provides certain short-to-medium term status, permitting migrants to
have some freedom and security within the United States, while
keeping resettlement as the ultimate goal.
C. (In)Efficiency of Individualized Decisions
Another potential point of general agreement is the desire for
administrative efficiency. Both the affirmative asylum system, for those
who apply from within the United States, and the defensive system in
http://journalistsresource.org/studies/international/conflicts/france-muslims-
terrorism-integration-research-roundup.
219. BAUMAN, supra note 1, at 18-19.
220. WORLD ECON. FORUM, THE GLOBAL RISKS REPORT 2016: 11TH EDITION 16
(2016), http://www.weforum.org/docs/GRR/WEF GRR16.pdf. Donald Kerwin
comments on this Report: "In other words, its diagnosis (crisis and risk) led it to
identify security and protection as complementary needs." Kerwin, Protection Policies
Strengthen Security, supra note 217, at 92.
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immigration courts, for those who have been charged with
removability, face extraordinary backlogs.221 In part, these systems are
overwhelmed by the kinds of decisions the system must make.
Complicated systems demand resources-governmental, private, and
otherwise. And the protection mechanisms for many of those arriving
from Central America are highly complex. Congress has created
several categories within immigration law that offer some form of
humanitarian protection to migrants who can establish their individual
eligibility. As early as 2004, this set of approaches to protection was
described as "piecemeal." '222 Humanitarian immigration sets out very
specific categories: refugees and asylees; crime victims, with special
provisions for human trafficking and domestic violence victims; and
abused, abandoned, or neglected children. Although not designed
with any specific nationality in mind, many of these forms of protection
offer possibilities for Central American migrants.
As individualized options, applicants must make highly context-and
fact-specific showings of eligibility, matching their situations to the
nuances of case law and agency guidance. Once within such a
category, these forms of protection generally lead quickly to
permanent residence and, ultimately, citizenship, as described below.
Such a path to citizenship makes these migration options highly valuable,
and this Article suggests that the difficulty and specificity of meeting
the eligibility requirements makes sense in light of that value.
221
1. Protection derived from the Refugee Convention
The first set of humanitarian options all derive from the Refugee
Convention itself-asylum, withholding of removal, and CAM status.
While the eligibility for each of these does differ, all three require
meeting the specific definition of a refugee. The definition of a
refugee comes from the Refugee Convention, imported into the INA
through the 1980 Refugee Act,224 covers those who are "unable or
221. Kerwin, 35th Anniversay of the Refugee Act of 1980, supra note 131, at 243.
222. Carolyn J. Seugling, Toward a Comprehensive Response to the Transnational
Migration of Unaccompanied Minors in the United States, 37VAND.J. TRANSNAT'LL. 861,865
(2004).
223. The value /difficulty trade-off shows up in reverse in the more broadly available
TPS programs, among others, which have no such path to citizenship and which leave
migrants in a liminal status that can last many years. Part III will explore these
programs as a contrast to those discussed in the following Sections.
224. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
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unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or
herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a
well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion."22' There are thus multiple elements that must be met:
someone must (1) have one or more of the five protected characteristics;
(2) have experienced persecution in the past or have a fear of persecution
in the future; (3) the persecution must be on account of the protected
ground (the "nexus" requirement); and (4) the government must be
unable or unwilling to protect them from this harm. It is available only
through case-by-case determinations. Early efforts to use asylum law to
provide blanket coverage to certain nations failed.226
2. The valuable protection of asylum
Asylum, as constituted in U.S. law, is both extremely narrow and
relatively generous. The path to the status is narrow, constrained by
the very specific definition of a "refugee," by evidentiary burdens, and
by the complexity of the legal process. The reward for obtaining the
status, on the other hand, is excellent, with its path to citizenship
within approximately five years of being granted asylum. AsJaya Ramji-
Nogales has written, "International refugee law's impressive power
benefits only a select group of migrants who can fit within the narrow
definition it lays OUt.
'
"227
The narrow availability of asylum was by design. As Refugee
Convention scholarJames Hathaway has written, the states drafting the
convention needed to balance protection with pressures for restriction:
The subjectivity of the refugee definition has provided a means of
legitimating this restrictionist tendency: the strong political and
economic links that exist between the West and many Third World
states of origin have led to a predisposition to question the
likelihood that those states could reasonably be expected to engage
in persecutory behavior .... As a result, the persecution-based
standard now poses a major political impediment to the recognition
225. Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 201, 94 Stat. 102, 102 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a) (42)).
226. Martinez-Romero v. INS, 692 F.2d 595, 595-96 (9th Cir. 1982) ("If we were to
agree with the petitioner's contention that no person should be returned to El
Salvador because of the reported anarchy present there now, it would permit the whole
population, if they could enter this country some way, to stay here indefinitely."). The
Martinez-Romero court concluded that relief could only be granted in the presence of
"special circumstances." Id.
227. Ramji-Nogales, supra note 25, at 613.
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of large numbers of refugee claims, humanitarian or human rights
concerns notwithstanding.
228
Consider the kinds of impediments that halt the paths of many
fleeing violence in Central America. As seen in the definition, fear of
generalized violence, no matter how likely, does not make someone
eligible for asylum. "Persecution" signifies harm inflicted "in order to
punish," and as the seminal Acosta229 case notes, "the word does not
encompass the harm that arises out of civil or military strife in a
country. '2 0 At the outset, then, those fleeing gang violence generally
are excluded from the definition of a refugee, unless they can prove
that violence is intended to punish them for one of the protected
characteristics (a nexus problem). In the context of societies where
violence is pervasive, proving the specific intent of the persecutor vis-
fi-vis a protected characteristic is difficult. The burden of proof is on
the applicant 2 1 to demonstrate through testimony and, in most cases,
through extensive corroborating evidence, 212 that the harm they fear
would be because of a protected characteristic that they have.
Even when applicants understand why the gang or the government
is targeting them, that reason may still not fit the definition of a
refugee. For example, gangs frequently target girls because of their
gender, but U.S. law does not recognize gender as a particular social
group because it is too broad. 2" Likewise, many migrants who run
small or family businesses have been threatened with death if they do
not make extortion payments to the gangs-and yet "business owner"
is not a reliable "particular social group" as courts have found
occupations to be changeableY.2 4 An applicant who is able to find a
creative lawyer might be able to develop a definition of their protected
category that works, but, as discussed below, this requires a
sophisticated synthesis of the facts with the case law, which generally
228. Hathaway, supra note 182, at 170.
229. Acosta, 19 1. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985).
230. Id. at 212.
231. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a) (2017).
232. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b) (1) (2012).
233. This makes the United States an outlier in international law, but the Refugee
Convention purposefully permits countries to make their own determinations on
matters such as this. See Susan F. Martin, Gender and the Evolving Refugee Regime, 29
REFUGEE SURV. Q. 104, 117-18 (2010).
234. See Ochoa v. Gonzales, 406 F.3d 1166, 1170-71 (9th Cir. 2005) (rejecting the
claim that Colombian business owners who refused demands from gangs or narcotics
traffickers are a particular social group).
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requires a lawyer well-versed in asylum law. It also often requires
time-consuming appeals, as described below, the development of
amicus briefs, and litigation in federal circuit courts, all of which takes
enormous resources and exacts an often-heavy price. Nonetheless,
through this work, people fleeing Central American violence often win
their asylum cases.2 6 The path is narrow, but the path exists.
Once won, asylum is a valuable form of protection, offering as it does
a fairly rapid path to citizenship: permanent residence is available after
one year, with its date of issuance back-dated one year. Four years later,
if no special issues like criminal problems arise in the interim, the
individual can apply for citizenship. 2 7 The status also immediately
permits the asylee to work lawfully, to bring family members in to the
United States, to travel on a refugee travel document, and to access some
medical, job-training, and other benefits for a period of eight months.
Although scholars have justly called for improvements to the support
system in place for asylees, 211 asylum can be seen rightly as a form of
both protection and integration, and, as a result, is highly valuable.
ProfessorJames Hathaway has written of the conundrum created by
the high value of integration-oriented systems like asylum in the United
States, noting that "[r] efugee law is... fundamentally a mechanism of
human rights protection, not a mode of immigration. By erroneously
insisting on an absolutist linkage between refugee status and a right of
235. See Representation is Key in Immigration Proceedings Involving Women with Children,
TRAC IMMIGRATION, http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/377 (last visited Oct.
23, 2017) (providing data on "women with children" cases, as many of these Northern
Triangle cases are classified). Less than thirty percent of "women with children" are
able to find representation. Id. "Without representation, women with children almost
never prevail even after they are able to demonstrate 'credible fear' of returning to
their own country-only 1.5 percent were allowed to stay. While few decisions have
occurred in represented cases, the win rate thus far has been 26.3 percent." Id.
236. See Ilona Bray, Which Countries Do Most People Granted Asylum in the U.S. Come
From?, NOLO, http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/which-countries-do-most-
people-granted-asylum-the-us-come-from.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2017) (showing
that the Northern Triangle countries hold three of the top five spots for most asylum
cases won).
237. Green Card for Asylees, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES,
https://www.uscis.gov/green-card/green-card-through-refugee-or-asylee-status/
green-card-asylee (last visited Oct. 23, 2017).
238. See, e.g., Lindsay M. Harris, From Surviving to Thriving? An Investigation of Asylee
Integration in the United States, 40 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 29, 37 (2016) (arguing
that legal and regulatory reform is needed to improve the asylee system).
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permanent immigration, advocates raise the stakes for governments. 2 19
Keeping asylum status valuable and narrow, while designing a different
form of protection with broader availability but less value may be the
satisfactory solution to this conundrum, and the Article suggests
precedents and contours for that protection in Part III, infra.
3. Less valuable withholding of removal
Under INA section 241, withholding of removal shares much in
common with asylum, but is dramatically less valuable. In one way, it
is harder to obtain: based on the same refugee definition that asylum-
seekers must meet, withholding applicants must show not simply a well-
founded fear of persecution (a roughly ten percent chance of harm
occurring), but show that the harm would be "more likely than not,"
or a greater than fifty percent chance.4 0 At the same time, withholding
is more expansive because it is not discretionary like asylum. Someone
eligible for asylum might be barred from the relief because they
applied more than one year after arriving in the United States or
because they have criminal convictions that would put discretionary
relief out of reach.24 1 The same is not true for withholding.
If granted withholding, the individual may work lawfully, and may
not be removed to the country where he or she faces persecution,
unless circumstances in that country change.242 Withholding status,
however, means that the individual cannot do many of the other things
an asylee can, such as travel, file applications to be reunited with family
members, or access the public benefits available to asylum-seekers.4 3
Most significantly, there is no path from withholding status to lawful
239. James C. Hathaway, Why Refugee Law Still Matters, 8 MELB. J. INT'L L. 88, 96
(2007).
240. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. 82-414, § 241, 66 Stat. 163,
204-08 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); see also INS v. Cardoza-
Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 443 (1987).
241. If an applicant has committed a particularly serious crime (or crimes), the
applicant may even be ineligible for withholding. Immigration and Nationality Act
§ 241(b) (3) (B) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (2012)); see also 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.16 (2017). This reflects the Refugee Convention's concern that states not be
forced to accept dangerous refugees. See Refugee Convention, supra note 2, 189
U.N.T.S. at 176 (Article 33(2)). The Convention's exclusion clause, Article I(F),
excludes from the definition of a refugee those who have "committed a crime against
peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity" or who have "committed a serious
non-political crime outside the country of refugee." Refugee Convention, supra note
2, 189 U.N.T.S. at 156.




permanent residence or, ultimately, U.S. citizenship.24 4 With these
limitations, it is significantly less valuable than asylum. It is a close
approximation of the non-refoulement principle at the heart of the
Refugee Convention; the principle was intended to be a basic form of
protection without the more robust protections and integrative
features of asylum. The Convention left any such additional features
up to individual states to grant or not, in the state's discretion.
4. Malleability and its costs
The Refugee Convention, specifically oriented to the aftermath of
World War II, has been broadly critiqued as not having the flexibility
to respond to the different kinds of migrations the world sees today.24a
Such critiques have come powerfully from the environmental scholars,
who see its limitations as rising oceans take the place of Refugee
Convention persecutors in forcing people's migration. 24 6  Feminist
scholars have also sharply criticized the "universality" of a convention
that failed to include gender as a protected ground.247 Nonetheless,
the definition of a refugee from the Refugee Convention is and always
has been malleable at its edges, with national implementing laws and
policies, and individual adjudications, adapting to new situations
248
and UNHCR sharing these national-level developments with
Convention-signatories more broadly.2 49
244. Id.; see also Geoffrey Heeren, The Status of Nonstatus, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 1115,
1143 (2015) (discussing the limitations to withholding of removal status).
245. See Jessica B. Cooper, Environmental Refugees: Meeting the Requirements of the
Refugee Definition, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 480, 482 (1998) (discussing that the current
refugee definition is too limited to accommodate the refugee population); Norman
Myers, Environmental Refugees: A Growing Phenomenon of the 21st Centuy, ROYAL SOC'Y,
609, 611-12 (2011) (arguing that the definition of refugee should be expanded to
include environmental refugees).
246. U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, THE ENVIRONMENT & CLIMATE CHANGE 1, 9
(2015), http://www.unhcr.org/540854f49.pdf; see Myers, supra note 245, at 483-84,
509 (explaining that migration due to environmental changes, particularly sea level
rise, will be more pervasive and problematic in coming years).
247. See, e.g.,Jacqueline Greatbatch, The GenderDifference: Feminist Critiques of Refugee
Discourse, 1 INT'LJ. REFUGEE L. 518, 518, 525 (1989) (arguing that women face barriers
to relief compared to other members of protected social groups and that there should
be a particular social group that better recognizes and protects women).
248. Hathaway, supra note 182, at 169 (discussing how the malleable standard for
refugee status allows "states to tailor its protection decisions to coincide with perceived
national self-interest").
249. Deborah Anker, Refugee Law, Gender, and the Human Rights Paradigm, 15 HARv.
HUM. RTs.J. 133, 137 (2002) ("Generally, the UNHCR tries to synthesize and advance
the best practices of states, and mediates among different protection systems ....
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The flexible boundaries of the framework embrace the work of
creative advocates, who have expanded the range of claims protected
under the Convention across the decades since its implementation.
This is especially true with the protected ground of "membership in a
particular social group," in which many gender-based violence and
gang-related claims fit.2"' It is also true with political opinion (explicit
and implied alike), as Debbie Anker and Palmer Lawrence have
powerfully argued," 1 but the focus of this Section is on the
developments within a particular social group ("PSG").
Even in the United States, which has a more limited approach to
understanding PSGs than many other countries,22 litigation has
expanded the understanding of how PSGs apply to Central American
forced migration on at least two fronts. First, in recent years, new PSGs
have emerged as viable bases for seeking asylum. We have seen the
approval of such PSGs as "married women in Guatemala who are
unable to leave their relationship,"2 ' "former gang membership,"24
and "family members of those who actively oppose gangs in El Salvador
by agreeing to be prosecutorial witnesses. '
Non-binding norms articulated by the UNHCR influence the standards for protection
in both legalized and non-legalized settings.").
250. See, e.g., Matthew J. Lister, Gang-Related Asylum Claims: An Overview and
Prescription, 38 U. MEM. L. REv. 827, 832 (2008).
251. Deborah Anker & Palmer Lawrence, "Third Generation" Gangs, Warfare in
Central America, and Refugee Law's Political Opinion Ground, 14-10 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1, 6
(Oct. 2014).
252. In the United States, PSGs must be innate, socially distinct, and sufficiently
"particular"-the third piece of which sets the United States apart from nations like
Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom, as well as from the UNHCR. The
UNHCR has noted that the Board of Immigration Appeals's
application of the "particularity" requirement appears to stem from a general
[misplaced] concern about the potential for unlimited expansion of the social
group ground . . . . "[T] he fact that large numbers of persons risk persecution
cannot be a ground for refusing to extend international protection where it is
otherwise appropriate."
UNHCR's Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of Petitioner at 21, Henriquez-Rivas v.
Holder, 670 F.3d 1033 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees,
Guidelines on International Protection: "Membership of a Particular Social Group,"
within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or Its 1967 Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees, 18, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/02/02 (May 7, 2002)).
253. A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 388 (B.I.A. 2014).
254. Martinez v. Holder, 740 F.3d 902, 913 (4th Cir. 2014).
255. Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117, 121 (4th Cir. 2011).
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Second, litigation has clarified the "nexus" standard for showing that
persecution is "on account" of a protected ground." 6 While "family"
has long been seen as a quintessential social group, 7 in Hernandez-
Avalos v. Lynch,2"' the government challenged asylum for lack of
evidence that persecution was "on account of" family ties. In that 2014
decision, the Fourth Circuit held that
[t] o prove that persecution took place on account of family ties, an
asylum applicant "need not show that his family ties provide 'the
central reason or even a dominant central reason' for his
persecution, [but] he must demonstrate that these ties are more
than 'an incidental, tangential, superficial, or subordinate reason'
for his persecution.'2a9
Creative lawyers are thus often able to expand the law's
understanding of who might fit within the refugee definition-both
through individual litigation, and through advocacy, such as the work
to have the federal government issue long-delayed gender
guidelines.26 0  As one example shows, however, the important
incremental adaptations of the law come at a significant expense.
In Martinez v. Holder,26 1 a case litigated by the University of Maryland
Immigration Clinic (led by Professor Maureen Sweeney), the clinic
represented a young former gang member, Julio Martinez, whom the
United States wanted to remove back to El Salvador. As Mr. Martinez
was detained, his first victory was securing representation at all-most
detainees do not.26 2  His second victory was securing the kind of
creative, diligent lawyers he did, through the clinic and Professor
Sweeney, who prepared his claim for withholding of removal.
The evidence-intensive hearing consumed a great deal of time, and
the client lost despite the clinic's efforts, with the Immigration Judge
256. Anjum Gupta, Nexus Redux, 90 IND. L.J. 465, 465 (2015).
257. Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 232-33 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled on other grounds by
Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987).
258. 784 F.3d 944 (4th Cir. 2015).
259. Id. at 949 (quoting Quinteros-Mendoza v. Holder, 556 F.3d 159, 164 (4th Cir.
2009)).
260. See Schoenholtz, supra note 8, at 122-23.
261. 740 F.3d 902 (4th Cir. 2014).
262. One recent study from New York showed that sixty percent of detained
immigrants went unrepresented, and of those transferred to detention centers outside
NewYork seventy-nine percent lacked counsel. PETER L. MARKOWITZ ETAL., STUDY GRP.
ON IMMIGRANT REPRESENTATION, ACCESSINGJUSTICE: THE AVAILABILITYAND ADEQUACYOF
COUNSEL IN IMMIGRATION PROCEEDINGS 1, 9-10 (2011),
https://www.ils.ny.gov/files/Accessing% 20Justice.pdf.
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concluding that Mr. Martinez was not in a protected group.
Specifically, his proposed membership in a particular social group
claim failed because the group needed to have a "common, immutable
characteristic" and "voluntary association with a criminal gang" was
unacceptable. 2" The clinic appealed the case to the Board of
Immigration Appeals, which upheld the judge's decision in October
2012.264 Undaunted, the clinic appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals, briefed the issues, gathered amici, and made oral
arguments in October 2013. Mr. Martinez emerged victorious in
January 2014 when the Fourth Circuit adopted Professor Sweeney's
legal reasoning.2 " Despite this victory, there were additional problems
that took even more time to solve.
The process was arduous for client and lawyers alike. Professor
Sweeney notes the financial and emotional burdens that the process
placed on Mr. Martinez and his family. 266 The burden on the lawyers
is not insignificant either. Others have identified the significant issue
of lawyer burnout and secondary trauma that arises in difficult cases
like the Martinez case. There is also a lurking efficiency problem:
imagine how many people could have been helped with the same time
and energy, if we had laws that required less of a fight.
The efficiency of using litigation to change the law has been long
debated, and has found robust support from Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes to Judge Posner.2 7 Common law has been seen as producing
'just rules" and being "elastic and flexible and so could adapt itself to
new circumstances while statutes could not change without legislative
action. '268 In other scholarship, I have strongly endorsed the flexible
discretionary edges of judicial decision-making. 26 9 The point being
made here is limited to this: as a way of responding to the immediate
needs of a relatively large group of forced migrants, litigation is not
263. Martinez, 740 F.3d at 908.
264. See id. at 907 ("From the BIA's final order of removal dated October 24, 2012,
Martinez filed this petition for review.").
265. Id. at 906.
266. Email from Maureen Sweeney, Professor, Univ. of Md. Sch. of Law, to
Elizabeth Keyes (Sept. 27, 2017, 4:25 PM) (on file with author).
267. See Nuno Garoupa & Carlos G6mez Ligfierre, The Evolution of the Common Law
and Efficiency, 40 GA.J. INT'L & COmP. L. 307, 309 (2012).
268. Andrew P. Morriss, Codification and Right Answers, 74 CHI.-KENTL. REv. 355, 376
(1999).
269. Elizabeth Keyes, Deferred Action: Considering What Is Lost, 55 WASHBURN L.J. 129
(2015); Elizabeth Keyes, Beyond Saints and Sinners: Discretion and the Need for New
Narratives in the U.S. Immigration System, 26 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 207 (2012).
[Vol. 67:89
UNCONVENTIONAL REFUGEES
going to be enough-and the nature of the limitations built into the
Refugee Convention itself means that even expanded understandings
of the "malleable" definitional framework will hit limits as a means of
addressing this forced migration.
D. Other Forms of Protection
Other forms of protection supplement the Refugee Convention
already and provide protection for some of those fleeing violence in
Central America, but even these have important limitations as applied
to forced migrants. Even with these options augmenting the Refugee
Convention options, our protection patchwork still leaves significant
gaps because none was designed with this forced migration in mind. A
chart comparing these options is printed at the end of this Section.
1. Special Immigrant Juvenile Status
Many Central American migrant children will qualify for Special
Immigrant Juvenile Status (SIJS), a path toward permanent residence
for those who, broadly speaking, have been abused, abandoned, or
neglected (or similar) by one or both parents, and whose return to
their home country would not be in their best interests. 270 There is a
significant area of overlap between the children fleeing Central
America on account of the violence there and the children eligible for
SIJS.271 Parental abuse, abandonment or neglect increases a child's
vulnerability to violence there. Violence in the home can leave a child
with few options but to spend more time on unsafe streets. An
abandoned child has less protection from gang predations or,
especially with girls, sexual assault (whether gang-related or not).
I have written elsewhere about the complexity of this process, which
looks a little bit different in every juvenile court in every sub-state
jurisdiction across the country, and which also leads to disparate results
that depend on where a child leaves.272 The complexity makes it essential
270. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (27) (2012).
271. See Elizabeth Keyes, Evolving Contours of Immigration Federalism: The Case of
Migrant Children, 19 HARV. LATINO L. REv. 33, 35 (2016) [hereinafter Keyes, Evolving
Contours] (discussing the intersection of state and federal law that makes SIJS cases
especially complex); Theresa Cardinal Brown, Arrival of Central American Children
Resulting in Backlog for Special Immigrant Juvenile Status, BIPARTISAN POL'Y CTR. (June 24,
2016), https://bipartisanpolicy.org/blog/central-american-children-backlog-special-
immigrant-juvenile-status (predicting that the number of SIJS cases from Central
America will create a years-long delay in acquiring Green Cards).
272. Keyes, Evolving Contours, supra note 271, at 35, 75.
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for the children to have lawyers but also requires those lawyers to possess
an unusual set of competencies, which limits the pool of available lawyers.27
Beyond the practical difficulties of fully implementing SIJS as a
protective form of immigration status for children, there is the
problem that SIJS was simply not intended to be a broad source of
protection, which is creating political backlash from some quarters.7 4
SIJS had a narrow purpose initially, for a specific subset of noncitizen
children in foster care. Expansions over the intervening years have
broadened the eligibility considerably, but with significant pushback from
the Department of Homeland Security through interpretive memoranda
and through the case law emerging from adjudications.27 ' Advocates for
children rightly push for as many of the affected Central American
children as possible to benefit from this means of achieving safety, but
their collective success has reinforced an idea from DHS 27 6 and more
273.
The work of representing vulnerable children in immigration proceedings
required a large number of pro bono lawyers to become overnight experts in
the intersection of two highly-specialized areas of the law: immigration
removal defense, and child custody, guardianship and dependency
proceedings. Immigration litigation is always difficult, but the children's cases
raise a host of special challenges.
Id. at 36 (internal citations omitted).
274. J. Weston Phippen, Young, Illegal, and Alone, ATLANTIC (Oct. 15, 2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/10/unaccompanied-minors-
immigrants/410404 (sharing the views of two congressmen who believe the SIJS
program should be drastically limited or eliminated because it is being abused).
275. See Memorandum from Donald Neufeld, Acting Assoc. Dir., Domestic
Operations, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., & Pearl Chang, Acting Chief,
Office of Policy & Strategy, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., to Field Leadership
(March 24, 2009), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/
Memoranda/StaticFiles Memoranda/2009/TVPRA SIJ.pdf (providing field
guidance on new legislation affecting adjudication of petitions filed for SIJS);
Memorandum from William R. Yates, Assoc. Dir. for Operations, U.S. Citizenship &
Immigration Servs., to Reg'l Dirs. and Dist. Dirs. (May 27, 2004),
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/StaticFilesM
emoranda/Archives%201998-2008/2004/sij memo_052704.pdf (addressing
eligibility issues relating to SIJS, application for adjustment, and express consent); see
alsoJessica R. Pulitzer, Note, Fear and Failing in Family Court: Special Immigrant Juvenile
Status and the State Court Problem, 21 CARDOZOJ.L. & GENDER 201, 227 (concluding that
family and state courts "have incredible power of the SIJS statute," often creating hurdles
and even contributing to "the shadow population of young, undocumented people").
276. The DHS U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Administrative Appeals
Office (AAO) has appellate authority over SIJS decisions, and it may issue precedent
decisions binding on the adjudicating officers. As documented by Professor Fisher
Page, the AAO is not supposed to "look behind" the state SIJS orders if they are facially
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recently from Congress, 7 7 that the system is not working as envisaged.
Moreover, many of those fleeing the Northern Triangle simply do
not fit within SIJS eligibility. Anyone over the age of either 18 or 21
(depending on an individual state's law) is too old for the program.
Those who meet the age requirements may not have a parent who
abused, abandoned, or neglected them. A child who fears gang violence
sufficient, yet does so often, with the result that a child who succeeded at the state level
fails at the federal level. See Daria Fisher Page, The Tension Between Deference and
Consent: An Analysis of the Jurisprudence of the Administrative Appeals Office in
Special ImmigrantJuvenile Status Cases, 1998-2014 38 (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author). Then, on April 12, 2016, the Department of State announced that
the numbers available for SIJS visas from the Northern Triangle were over-subscribed,
meaning the USCIS essentially stopped accepting applications for the year. U.S. Dep't
of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Visa Bulletin: Immigrant Numbers for May 2016,
https: //travel.state.gov/ content/ dam/visas /Bulletins /visabulletinMay2016.pdf (last
visited Oct. 23, 2017); see also Practice Advisoiy on Updated Procedures for Status Adjustment
Filings for Certain SIJS Clients, KIDS IN NEED OF DEFENSE (Apr. 18, 2016),
https: //supportkind.org/wp-content/uploads/ 2016/ 04/KIND-Practice-Advisory-Re-
SIJ-Visa-Availability-04.18.16-2.pdf.
277. Congress periodically considers SIJS. Under its current Republican
leadership, it sees the program as a vehicle for fraudulent immigration. In March
2015, the House Judiciary Committee Chair Bob Goodlatte wrote to DHS Secretary
Jeh Johnson asking him to address fraud in light of a recently televised investigative
report into fraudulent SIJS claims in NewYork concerning migrants from India. Press
Release, Bob Goodlatte, Congressman, Goodlatte to Secretary Johnson: Changes
Needed to Reduce Fraud in Immigration System (Mar. 19, 2015),
http://goodlatte.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID 298.
Cf Lindsey Kaley & Kim Susser, Setting the Record Straight on SIJS, N.Y. LEGAL ASSISTANCE
GRP. (Mar. 23, 2015), http://nylag.org/blog/2015/03/setting-the-record-straight-on-
sijs (advocating for more judges to relieve the overburdened New York family courts
rather than closing the SIJS program); Kirk Semple, Federal Scrutiny of a Youth
Immigration Program Alarms Advocates, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2015),
http: //www.nytimes.com/ 2015 /04 /01/nyregion /federal-scrutiny-of-a-youth-
immigration-program-alarms-advocates.html (providing examples of advocates who
say sufficient safeguards are in place to protect against the alleged scam, but that there
was no indication of a scam). USCIS has acknowledged the need for better fraud
protection; one motivation behind its decision to centralize adjudications of SIJS
claims in 2015 (implementation is still in process) was to reduce fraud. Director
Rodriguez noted in testimony to Congress about the work of the Fraud Detection and
National Security Directorate ("FDNS"), "Centralization will better leverage and
develop the expertise of personnel adjudicating [Special ImmigrantJuvenile] benefits,
to ensure consistency and better identify fraud indicators and trends." Written
Testimony of USCIS Director Leon Rodriguez for a House Committee on the Judiciay,
Subcommittee on Immigration and Border Security Hearing Titled "Oversight of U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration Services," DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY (Dec. 9, 2015),
https: //www.dhs.gov/news /2015 /12/ 09 /written-testimony-uscis-director-house-
judiciary-subcommittee-immigration-and-border.
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but who has two loving parents will not benefit from SIJS, even when
SIJS is applied as expansively as possible. SIJS thus offers only a limited
supplement to protection for those fleeing Northern Triangle violence.
2. Convention against Torture
In another individualized remedy, Article III of the Convention
against Torture (CAT) offers relief from removal for individuals who
fear torture in their home countries-so long as the torture would be
committed by government agents or with the acquiescence of
government agents.278  In FY 2015, 625 individuals received
withholding or deferral of removal under the Convention, while 9858
were denied-a 6.3 percent grant rate. 279 The low grant rate captures
the narrowness of the relief. CAT's requirement of government
participation in or acquiescence to torture sets a high bar for relief.
Acquiescence is tightly construed.8 0 In a typical case denying CAT
protection, the First Circuit found that Salvadoran police failure to
help in extortion cases did not constitute "acquiescence" to gang
extortion.21 In some circuits, there is a slightly more expansive reading
of acquiescence to include "willful blindness" by the government.2 2
Despite the high standard, individuals fleeing gang violence may
qualify for CAT protection when the facts of their particular case
demonstrate a close connection between the police or army officials
and the persecution. Gang infiltration of the police is well
278. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, pmbl., Dec. 10, 1984, 108 Stat. 382, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85; see
also 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c) (2) (2017).
279. FY 2015 STATISTICSYEARBOOK, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGR.
REv. MI (2016), https://wwwjustice.gov/eoir/page/file/fysblS/download (showing
the number of CAT claims that were withdrawn and abandoned, as well as "other"
claims that likely include those who filed asylum or withholding applications alongside
their CAT claim, and won relief on one of the other grounds).
280. "To demonstrate 'acquiescence' by Colombian Government officials, the
respondent must do more than show that the officials are aware of the activity
constituting torture but are powerless to stop it. He must demonstrate that Colombian
officials are willfully accepting of the guerrillas' torturous activities." S-V-, 22 1. & N. Dec.
1306, 1312 (B.I.A. 2000) (emphasis added). But see Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186,
1196 (9th Cir. 2003) (disapproving of the BIA's S-V- decision and expanding the
"willful acceptance" standard to include governmental "willful blindness" to torture).
281. Granada-Rubio v. Lynch, 814 F.3d 35, 40 (1st Cir. 2016) (per curiam); see also
Amouri v. Holder, 572 F.3d 29, 35 (1st Cir. 2009) (denying protection because the
government's failure to control gangs did not amount to "acquiescence" under CAT).
282. See, e.g., Amir v. Gonzales, 467 F.3d 921, 927 (6th Cir. 2006) (joining the Ninth
and Second Circuits in accepting the "willful blindness" standard for acquiescence).
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documented, especially in El Salvador,"' and is also a known phenomenon
in Honduras and Guatemala." 4 If an individual makes a persuasive
showing about government involvement or acquiescence, CAT
provides limited benefits."' It is available whether or not the migrant
has serious criminal convictions, but a CAT victory only means relief
from removal and work authorization. Recipients have no path to
permanent residence and citizenship and may be indefinitely detained
by DHS if deemed too dangerous for release to the community.
3. Visas for crime survivors
Finally, some Central American migrants, once here, may qualify for
visas after being victims of a serious crime. Because of the
vulnerabilities of new immigrants, and especially undocumented
immigrants who have difficulty finding secure employment or safe
housing, some percentage of the migrants will be victims of crimes,
ranging from assault to robbery to rape to human trafficking." 6 Any
of these, and more, provide a basis to possible immigration relief
through the U visa 8 7 (for victims of a large number of fairly serious
crimes) or the T visa2 .8 (for victims of human trafficking). So long as
the migrants cooperate with the investigation or prosecution of the
crime, and in the case of U visas, they live in a jurisdiction where
officials provide the required certification, they may be able to apply
for one of these visas, which then puts them on a path toward
permanent residence and citizenship. 2 9  Some number of Central
American migrants may qualify for these, but the remedy is
disconnected from the reason for migration, and eligibility is a
happenstance of who is unfortunate enough to be re-victimized by
crime once in the United States.
283. Mimi Yagoub, 480 Gang Members Infiltrated El Salvador Security Forces: Report,
INSIGHT CRIME (Feb. 22, 2016), http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/did-480-
gang-members-infiltrate-el-salvador-security-forces.
284. Renwick, supra note 39.
285. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.16 (2017).
286. Garance Burke, AP Investigation: Feds'Failures Imperil Migrant Children, Assoc.
PRESS (Jan. 25, 2016), https://apnews.com/e87200e7361b412fa8cld5003b7bf357/ap-
investigation-feds-failures-imperil-migrant-children; Mary Turck, Central American
Children Face New Peril in the US, AL JAZEERA (Jan. 30, 2016),
http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2016/1/central-american-children-face-
new-peril-in-the-united-states.html.
287. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (15) (U) (i) (2012).
288. § 1101(a) (15) (T) (i).
289. § 1101(a) (15) (U) (i).
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4. Humanitarian parole
DHS has the ability to issue humanitarian parole (HP) to
temporarily admit someone who has no other lawful way to enter the
United States.2 9 It issues humanitarian parole only under compelling
humanitarian circumstances. It is implicitly part of the CAM
program,2 91 which relies on the parole authority, but could be available
to those without the CAM's requirement of a qualifying relative in the
United States. Nothing in the parole authority precludes that result.
However, in practice, HP is granted extremely rarely.292 Moreover, we
have seen from other programs like Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals (DACA), that delineating clear eligibility criteria inevitably
creates clear ineligibility criteria that reduces the likelihood of being
granted broader relief (like deferred action, in the DACA context).293
The CAM program provides clear criteria for those fleeing the
Northern Triangle who qualify, and it seems unlikely that those falling
outside the criteria could qualify for broader HP absent extremely
compelling circumstances. Furthermore, as "parole" signifies, it is not
a sturdy immigration status. Indeed, it does not even legally constitute
an admission to the United States, as if the border were a rubber band
around the individual paroled in.294 There are no benefits attached to
parole, except for the intrinsic benefit of achieving temporary safety
(in the case of Central American migrants using HP to flee danger).
As Don Kerwin, Director for the Center on Migration, notes, such
programs, along with TPS, "rest primarily on executive discretion, fail
290. § 1182(d)(5)(A).
291. CAM Guidance, supra note 107.
292. USCIS estimates that worldwide, approximately 300 people annually receive
humanitarian parole. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., REFUGEE, ASYLUM
AND INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE: HUMANITARIAN PAROLE PROGRAM
(2011), https: //www.uscis.gov/ sites/ default/ files /USCIS /Resources /Resources9%20
for% 20Congress/Congressional% 20Reports/2011% 20National% 201mmigration% 20
%26% 20Consular% 20Conference%20Presentations/HumanitarianParoleProgram
.pdf.
293. Elizabeth Keyes, Deferred Action: Considering What Is Lost, 55 WASHBURN L.J. 129,
132-33 (2015). Moreover, opponents viewed the clear eligibility criteria as executive
overreach, bypassing Congress; the opposition generated from this led ultimately to
the rescission of DACA. Michael D. Shear &Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump Moves to End
DACA and Calls on Congress to Act, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2017),
https: //www.nytimes.com/ 2017 /09 /05 /us /politics /trump-daca-dreamers-
immigration.html.
294. See8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A).
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to cover numerous at-risk populations, and do not typically lead to
permanent status or other durable solutions."29 '
Figure 1: Showing Where We Are Now
More Valuable
Asylum, T, U Cuban Adjustment





In a system reliant on individualized determinations, accuracy of
those determinations matter. Where relief is valuable, there is an
inevitably a desire to squeeze an individual into a framework not
intended for that person's case. Marc Rosenblum of the Migration
Policy Institute has written about the importance of making accurate
determinations, despite the challenges of doing so: "[A] fundamental
immigration policy challenge is how to protect vulnerable populations
while restricting the admission of people who may be fleeing deeply
difficult conditions but lack valid claims to humanitarian protection in
the United States." '2 96 Rosenblum's assessment is descriptively accurate
of a system in which protection is individualized.
It is especially true of a system in which the path to eligibility for
individualized protection is legally and procedurally complex, as
295. Kerwin, 35th Anniversay of the Refugee Act of 1980, supra note 131, at 207.
296. MARC R. ROSENBLUM, UNACCOMPANIED CHILD MIGRATION TO THE UNITED
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discussed above.29 7 With the high-value benefit of asylum comes a
stringent screening process that rightly separates out those who qualify
from those who do not. Robust implementation of the rules we have
now is critical, and the critique that the government lacks resources to
do so adequately is both important and accurate.298 Writing about a
different context, but one with familiar tensions, one scholar shows
how injustices result when complex laws are administered without
sufficient resources to make accurate determinations. 29 9  He writes,
"[T]he numbers versus rights trade-off is an empirical trend that
results from this incoherency, the implications of which challenge the
fundamental principles of the international refugee regime."3' 0
The importance of accuracy in a high-stakes protection regime,
beyond being normatively important, also reveals an important
underlying premise that this Article challenges: resignation and
adaptation to the complex and narrow rules that we have. If a system
depends on high levels of resources to function even at the most basic
level, a rule of law analysis suggests only two possible answers. One
answer is to allocate sufficient resources for the present system to
297. Regarding the earlier Rosenblum quote: First, there is implicit in this
dichotomy a notion that humanitarian protection is charity; humanitarian protection,
in all its forms, can be seen as rooted in an almost moral contract between the state
and the individual receiving state protection, which heightens the need for ensuring
a high degree of accuracy that the person receiving protection is eligible for the
protection. The United States, understandably, does not want its humanitarian
impulses "taken advantage of by undeserving individuals. Such an idea is normatively
appealing, and in large part defensible, but must be challenged by acknowledging the
United States' role in driving the migration-which makes the relationship more
complex than savior-supplicant.
298. As one scholar noted about a different forced migration context, "An
interdependency however between the lack of proper legal framework and
overburdening in cases where the institutions are obviously running out of capacities
to perform their mandate as anticipated can lead to tragedies as the one in Cairo,"
where twenty asylum-seekers were killed in 2005 while protesting the lengthy process
in harsh conditions for hearing their claims. Maja Smrkolj, International Institutions
and Individualized Decision-Making: An Example of UNHCR s Refugee Status Determination,
9 GERMAN L.J. 1779, 1780-81 (2008); Brian Whitaker, 20 Killed as Egyptian Police Evict
Sudanese Protesters, GUARDIAN (Dec. 30, 2005, 8:33 PM),
https: //www.theguardian .com/world /2005/dec /31 /sudan.brianwhitaker.
299. Meher Talib, Numbers Versus Rights: State Responsibility Towards Asylum Seekers
and the Implications for the International Refugee Regime, 27 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 405, 419-21
(2013) (using Greece as a case study to show how countries respond to increased
migrants with greater restrictions to deter asylum seekers or by mistreating asylum
seekers).
300. Id. at 405.
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function as designed-something that has thus far failed as a political
matter with the resulting strain on multiple government agencies. The
other answer is to imagine a new system that could function well within
the resources available. It is to this task that the Article now turns.
F Rule of Law Arguments and Counter-Arguments
Respect for the rule of law underlies aspects of the debates over what
to do with unconventional refugees, and yet the rule of law concerns
push and pull toward different policy goals. Generally, fair and
accurate implementation of laws is a fundamental aspect of respecting
the rule of law, which encompasses such ideas as orderly entrance, due
process rights, and-at opposite ends of the current political
spectrum-legalization and enforcement. 0 1  Congress, in
implementing the Refugee Convention and in defining procedural
due process at the border, has defined the rules that apply to
migrants-from definitional 2 to the procedural.0 3 Our Constitution
delegates implementation and administration of these laws to the
Executive, imbuing everything from administrative decision-making to
detention policy with the validity of the "rule of law" mantel.0 4
Recent Central American migration illustrates the inherent tensions
within rule of law concerns. On the one hand, the rule of law at the
301. As early as 1983, the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy
noted the difficulty of agreeing on principles of the rule of law in the immigration
context. Of three principles of immigration reform, including international
cooperation and the open society, the rule of law has been seen as the most powerful,
yet the most controversial. Lawrence H. Fuchs, Immigration Policy and the Rule of Law,
44 U. PITT. L. REv. 433, 438-39 (1983). "It was the principle of the rule of law that had
the most significance in forming the recommendations of the Commission, and yet
was the most difficult to translate into recommendations." Id. Two articles about
President Obama's DACA policy highlights the political debate about what constitutes
the rule of law in immigration. Compare Ross Douthat, The Great Immigration Betrayal,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/16/opinion/sunday/
ross-douthat-the-great-immigration-betrayal.html (arguing that the White House's
reliance on prosecutorial discretion is "persuasive only if abstracted from any sense of
precedent or proportion or political normity"), with Ilya Somin, Obama, Immigration,
and the Rule of Law, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Nov. 20, 2014),
https:/ /www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/ 11 20/
obama-immigration-and-the-rule-of-law (contending that President Obama's actions
on immigration are within the scope of his authority).
302. Consider, for example, that the Refugee Act incorporates the Refugee
Convention's definition and protections into domestic law.
303. For example, the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008
provides certain right and processes to unaccompanied minors at the border.
304. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
2017]
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
border requires that government officials handle the case of each
individual at the border in certain ways. For example, current law
requires that unaccompanied minors (from countries other than
Mexico) be transferred to Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) custody while their cases are heard."' Likewise, children and
adults expressing fear of return at the border are entitled by law to
have those claims heard." 6 By availing themselves of protections written
into our laws and policies, those migrants who express a fear of
returning are complying with the rule of law. And officers hearing these
claims and permitting entrance are upholding a core principle underlying
the rule of law: congruence between the law and official action.
7
On the other hand, large numbers of individuals arriving without
visas at the border strain resources throughout the various agencies
involved, and also create a sense of immigration chaos, both of which
undermine the rule of law.0 8 Both those favoring protection and those
favoring restriction see the lack of resources as a significant problem
in this regard. 0 9 As a rare point of agreement across the spectrum, it
is worth elucidating exactly how the under-resourcing of these
agencies undermines both protection and enforcement.
Consider the various agencies involved in this process. First, Border
Patrol: The numbers alone would strain resources, but that strain is
compounded by the complexity of laws the Border Patrol agents must
administer as the "first responders" at the border, determining whether
expedited removal is appropriate, transferring unaccompanied minors
305. 8 U.S.C. § 1232(a) (4), (5) (2012).
306. 8 C.F.R. § 208.31(c) (2017) (providing the regulation for reasonable fear
interviews); § 235.3(b) (4) (providing for credible fear interviews in expedited removal
proceedings).
307. See LON FULLER, THE MORALITYOF LAw 209-10 (rev. ed. 1969) (articulating that
the congruence of official action with declared law is essential to the rule of law). As
with H.L.A. Hart's response to Fuller, this Section of the Article does not assume the
justness of the laws and procedures. See H.L.A. Hart, Book Review: Lon Fuller, The
Morality of Law, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1284, 1286 (1965). Instead, the Article
momentarily accepts the Fuller premise that the rule of law requires rules be justly
promulgated and enacted. Even on these terms, the result as concerns immigration is
indeterminate.
308. See, e.g., Bill O'Reilly, Why Does Illegal Immigration Chaos Continue in the U.S.?,
Fox NEWS (June 9, 2016), http://www.foxnews.com/transcript/2016/06/09/why-
does-illegal-immigration-chaos-continue-in-us (transcribing an O'Reilly Factor
segment where Bill O'Reilly criticized Democrats' immigration policy).
309. Josh Siegel, Most in Surge of Child Border Crossers Aren't Leaving, Authorities Say,




toward HHS custody, or sending other migrants toward USCIS for
interviews to determine whether they have a credible fear of returning.
Second, USCIS: USCIS's obligation to have asylum officers conduct
these interviews 10 has required detailing officers from asylum offices
across the country to the border. This has resulted in tremendous
backlogs at regional asylum offices, where individual asylum-seekers may
now wait multiple years before having an initial asylum interview. 11
Third, Immigration Courts: Because the Administration has
determined that these are priority cases for removal, 1 2 Immigration
Courts must schedule initial hearings within twenty-one days of receiving
a Notice to Appear,1 which creates the need to reschedule other lower-
priority cases, and results in extremely crowded courtrooms,
unpredictable dockets, lower-priority cases being delayed, and so forth.
The rule of law arguments therefore do not themselves lead toward
one particular policy solution: deterrence would reduce the strain on
the immigration system at the border and in the interior, yes, but
potentially at a cost to legal obligations. Increased resources would
also reduce the strain at the border and in the interior, while
complying with international legal obligations, but at a fiscal cost
during a time when loud and powerful factions within the United
States demand fiscal restraint.
We have seen the philosophical justifications for doing more,
especially-if not exclusively-in the context of unconventional
refugees. We then added to those justifications the practical import of
providing a better response that looks at root causes, short-term well-
being, administrative efficiency, and respect for the typical arguments
against doing more: deterrence and rule of law. The final
consideration is simply that there is a reality to migration patterns that
we cannot deny. As we turn to a new framework, it is worth heeding
the words of philosopher Ulrich Beck:
310. 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(d).
311. ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES, Am. IMMIGR. COUNCIL 4 (Aug. 2016),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/asylum_
in the united states.pdf (reporting that the average asylum-seeker waits at least two
years for an initial interview with an asylum officer).
312. See Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements, Exec.
Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,793 (Jan. 25, 2017) (expanding the pool of
undocumented immigrants who officials should consider a priority for removal).
313. See generally Letter from Am. Immigration Lawyers Assoc., et al., to Juan Osuna,
Dir., Exec. Office for Immigration Review (Feb. 9, 2015),
https: //www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites /default/ files /practice-advisor y
/lacpa_092104.pdf.
2017]
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
We have been already cast (without having been asked) into a
cosmopolitan condition of universal, humanity-wide
interdependence. But we are still missing, and have not yet started
in earnest to compose and acquire, an accompanying cosmopolitan
awareness.... [Refugees] may well remain the collateral victims of
this lack of understanding until such time that we try in earnest to
attend to that lag's institutional, state-based foundations.
3 14
The final Section of this Article attempts to attend to those foundations.
IV. CONCEPTUALIZING BROADER PROTECTION FOR
TODAY'S FORCED MIGRANTS
"[Refugees] make us aware, and keep reminding us, of what we would
dearly like toforget or better still to wish away: of some global, distant,
occasionally heard about but mostly unseen, intangible, obscure,
mysterious, and not easy to imagine forces, powerful enough to interfere
with our lives while neglecting and ignoring our own preferences. ,
3 15
In this Part, the Article suggests a framework that takes into
consideration the moral, historical, and pragmatic justifications for
responding. Given the array of competing interests and tensions laid
out already in this Article, it is clear that a perfect solution is simply not
possible. The host of impossible contradictions leaves us with only two
options: do nothing, or do something satisfactory but less-than-
perfect. Philosopher Oona O'Neill confronts this reality, noting that
in the need to confront the world we do live in, the only place to viably
start is with the Kantian question of what receiving countries can do,
and not the question of what would-be migrants are owed: "In
beginning with the traditional, Kantian question 'What ought I (or we)
do?', rather than with the recipients' question 'What ought I (or we)
get?', we face realities more forthrightly and pose a question that we
can address, even if only by beginning the task of constructing
institutions. 31' 6 The political environment that this particular situation
confronts also makes many of these goals, even if feasible as a policy-
matter, unobtainable politically.
This Article, however, is more concerned with changing and
broadening the norms and discourse around protection by
314. Evans & Bauman, supra note 192.
315. BAUMAN, supra note 1, at 16.
316. O'NEILL, supra note 170, at 199.
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contributing to the growing recognition that protection means more
than refugee protection, and that our current patchwork system creates
untenable resource strains that undermine all the possible goals of a
protection regime, from humanitarian goals to self-interested goals.
Countries around the world have long looked for local and regional
approaches to population displacements. 1 7 Generally, the United
States has been geographically removed from the need for such
regional efforts, with the exception of a major, ongoing commitment
to Cuban migrants, and a much less concerted effort for Central
Americans in the 1980s. The depth of the governance and safety
problems in the Northern Triangle, and the strong historic patterns of
migration that lead toward the United States, now make the United
States part of the need for a regional solution, one piece of which
could be the framework offered below.
A. Necessary Preconditions
A focus on root-causes must be the centerpiece to any policy
response. If Central American patterns are ongoing, and driven by
deep-rooted conditions of poor governance, a critical response to that
reality is prevention, through long-term, serious investment in
changing the root causes of forced migration. Since 2014, root causes
have entered the dialogue, but at first in only a limited, window-
dressing way (when a miniscule percentage of the budget for
addressing the situation went toward governance in the Northern
Triangle, and the overwhelming majority went to detention of the
migrants). More can and will be done, and may already be having a
positive impact."' But in the meantime, as migrants continue to arrive,
we must respond and we must respond in ways that work and fit this
particular migration problem.
Necessary work on root causes, while the ultimate antidote to the
fears of ongoing, large-scale migration from the Northern Triangle to
the United States, is no short-term answer. Again, the situation exists,
and needs to be addressed instead of wished away. With necessary work
on root causes being a long-term proposition, the policy response to
317. Hathaway, supra note 182, at 159.
318. See Sonia Nazario, How the Most Dangerous Place on Earth Got Safer, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 11, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/14/opinion/sunday/how-the-
most-dangerous-place-on-earth-got-a-little-bit-safer.html (identifying the reduced
crime rate in Honduras's Rivera Hernandez neighborhood, resulting from U.S.
funding for violence prevention).
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forced migration must, at the very least, work on a short-to-medium
term approach. Such an approach, as suggested in the following
Section, may entail protection of less value and less permanence than
the Refugee Convention provides, from concern that something highly
valuable and durable would add a large pull factor to the push-factors
driving migration now.
B. One Example of a New Framework
The migration is happening; we can wish it would not, or we can
respond to it. Because the means of wishing it would not happen are,
at best, a medium-term proposition, the foremost principle of a
broader protection system is to promote short-term well-being through
a system that fits the migration flows.
This system shares some similarities with the sojourner status being
implemented in Europe, for those who "would face a real risk of
suffering serious harm"-a standard short of fearing persecution. 19
Subsidiary protection provides broader protection than that available
for those found to be refugees.12' However, the proposal in this Article
differs in two important ways. First, unlike Europe's subsidiary
protection, this system emphasizes administrative efficiency by
embracing a per-country approach to the status, wherein people would
be presumed eligible by virtue of their specific country of origin (like
TPS) ',21 and only eliminated from eligibility on an individualized
showing of harm to the United States by permitting them to remain.
Second, the subsidiary protection in Europe goes through the same
system that determines whether someone has an asylum claim, and the
goal of this Article's proposal is to reduce the burden on that asylum-
adjudication system by creating a separate and more easily
administered alternative.
The status envisioned by this Article would be akin to a sojourner
status for individuals from designated countries, and would be based
on simple criteria like those of TPS, which are country-based, and from
which only unfavorable factors would disqualify an individual.122 The
status would last for five years with a possibility of renewal unless the
319. Directive 2011/95, art. 2(f), 2011 O.J. (L 337) 5 (EU).
320. See generally Ostrand, supra note 9, at 261.
321. See supra Section I.C.
322. For example, under INA section 212, individuals may be disqualified for a
range of reasons, including a history of persecution of others, significant criminal
convictions, national security risks, and more.
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government declares that conditions have sufficiently improved in the
designated country to allow return. If a country is designated
sufficiently safe, the migrants would have the option to apply for a new
form of cancellation of removal in court, available for those who can
demonstrate strong ties to the United States-a concept defined with
sufficient specificity that it would provide an off-ramp from the time-
limited status to permanent residence. This off-ramp honors the
concerns laid out by Joseph Carens about the ethical insufficiency of
permanent temporary status: "Democratic states cannot keep people
indefinitely in 'temporary' status. That is the clear lesson of the
European experience with guest workers in the mid-twentieth century.
States that are not committed to democratic principles behave
differently .... "32
This simple framework flows from the principle of fitting the
response to the actual migration flow. Within this principle of "fit" are
the related principles of administrative efficiency and access to justice:
a system with simple criteria will be easier, faster, and less costly to
administer. The complexity of the highly-individualized remedies,
including asylum, 24 put remedies beyond the reach of those needing
protection, and consume governmental and private resources out of
proportion to the actual benefit offered. A simpler system will be far
more accessible to migrants through community education, legal
workshops, and lower-cost legal services, and will demand fewer
governmental resources to adjudicate and manage.
Related to the question of fit is an effort to limit the benefit, by
connecting it to U.S. history with the designated country or countries.
Only those with a parent, grandparent, sibling or child already living
in the United States could apply for this benefit. This recognizes that
the migrants are coming to the United States in many cases because of
existing connections, like relatives who have been here in many cases
since the 1980s. Those without such relatives have less reason to favor
the United States as a destination for protection, and could (and do)
seek refuge in other countries like Nicaragua and Costa Rica. 2 5 If they
came to the United States, they would need to qualify for the higher
323. CARENS, supra note 35, at, 113.
324. See supra Section III.C.
325. Cf Lindsay Fendt, Costa Rica to Refugees: Come, Stay Awhile, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP. (Jan. 31, 2017, 10:13 AM), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-
countries /articles/ 2017-01-31 /costa-rica-becomes-an-alternative-for-refugees ("In
2016, more than 30,000 undocumented migrants crossed into Costa Rica, and the
country is now receiving 100 migrants a day at its southern border.").
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standard of asylum. 26 But limiting the broadly available protection to
those with existing ties mirrors and responds to the historical
migration patterns. Already people with ties are choosing the difficult
travel to the United States, and many of those without such ties are
instead going to neighboring Costa Rica, Mexico, or Nicaragua.
Those without such relatives do not benefit from the same historical
and context-driven responsibilities and should not be able to access the
benefit. For them, the narrower paths of asylum or SIJS would still be
available, and with many migrants diverted from those narrower paths
through this new status, it would be more possible to serve and
adjudicate those individuals' claims quickly and fairly.
Another important aspect of fitting protection to this situation is
framing it as a short-term response, where effective repatriation-not
citizenship in the United States-is the long-term goal for most
migrants, and integration into the United States is the goal for only a
smaller subset of the migrants. Repatriation and integration exist in
vivid tension, with one vision competing forcefully against the other.
Successful integration of long-term migrants is in the interests of the
United States. 27 Forces moving toward integration in the United
States are particularly strong once U.S. born children become a factor
in a family's decisions (although other ties may be ethically significant
as well). However, with decades of experience and study of this issue,
UNHCR has developed principles for repatriation that would be
helpful. 28 U.S. citizenship is not the only ultimate success of a migrating
population; for many, success would include safe return to their home
countries if the possibility of economic and physical security exists there.
326. See Five Facts About Migration from Central America's Northern Triangle, WASH.
OFFICE ON LATIN AM. (Jan. 15, 2016), https://www.wola.org/analysis/five-facts-about-
migration-from-central-americas-northern-triangle (explaining that ongoing violence
and general danger motivates individuals who live in the Northern Triangle to leave
their countries for the United States).
327. See supra Section III.B.
328. See generally U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, POLICY FRAMEWORK AND
IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY: UNHCR's ROLE IN SUPPORT OF THE RETURN AND
REINTEGRATION OF DISPLACED POPULATIONS (2008), http://www.unhcr.org/en-
us/partners/guides/4c2203309/policy-framework-implementation-strategy-unhcrs-
role-support-return-reintegration.html (explaining UNHCR's reintegration principles
and practices: national responsibility and ownership; rights, justice, and
reconciliation; participatory and community-based approaches; situational analysis;




A policy that strictly limits repatriation to a time when the United
States could be sure of the migrant's safety upon return supports,
rather than acts in tension with, the longer-term project of rebuilding
those countries. A high-quality repatriation project would turn the
historical norm on its head; a norm where, for example, the United
States sent back gang-involved felons without any coordination or
communication with Northern Triangle governments, planting the
seeds for today's gang violence in the region. 29 By contrast, limiting
repatriation once the region's safety improves would focus on helping
people settle in safe areas, find adequate housing, return with
economic (and language) skills that would promote economic growth,
and so forth. For decades, immigrant advocates have defined
citizenship as success and deportation as punishment. The
resettlement paradigm offers an alternative definition of success:
effective resettlement not as punishment, but as pragmatic and
offering the possibility of good long-term outcomes.
By emphasizing the goal of repatriation from the outset, the clear
expectation is that most of those receiving protection should always have
in mind plans and a strategy for an eventual return. There are lessons the
United States can learn from the best practices of humanitarian relief
globally to do advanced repatriation planning, and to work with the
receiving countries on such diverse issues as housing and safety planning.
CONCLUSION
This Article has shown how our current system of protection fails the
unconventional refugees who comprise a large part of the
contemporary migrant population, which is the result of the nature
and reality of modern forces causing migrant flows around the globe.
The Article identifies an ethical duty and policy imperative to build
support for the politically difficult notion of doing more, at a time
when loud, insistent voices clamor instead for restriction and doing
less. The existing protection is based on the Refugee Convention
which hails from a post-World War II context and fails to fully apply to
the forces driving migration today; asylum and other protection
options fail to correspond to the full realities of Central American,
Syrian, and other forced migrations, and reveal how reliance on
individualized protection fails these migrants. Even at its fullest
interpretive extent, the Refugee Convention cannot protect all those
329. See supra Section II.B.
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currently seeking refuge in the United States, and this Article argues
that all do merit some form of protection.
Existing protection options have stretched governmental and
private actors to a breaking point, leaving important systems at our
borders exhausted. The payoff for this border and resource
exhaustion is, at the same time, paltry at best, and harmful at worst: we
are not offering meaningful protection to so many who are in need of
it, and while migrants dwell in the drawn-out uncertainties of our
existing system, we fail at both integration and repatriation, and we
devote too few resources to truly improving the security of the
countries from which they flee. This Article seeks to balance the two
values of protection and deterrence which are in constant battle within
the immigration debate in the United States.
The broader framework envisaged in this Article is only a starting
point for a conversation aimed less at making much needed
improvements in the existing system, and more at thinking beyond
existing options to devise a solution that fits the actual problem. The
solution replaces costly individualized adjudications with broader,
simpler protection that is easier to access. It privileges investment in
the security and governance of the sending countries as the only
durable way to change migration patterns in the long-term. And it
balances the medium-term goals of repatriation with American
interests in fully integrating immigrants who may be here longer term.
As Europeans deal with the exponentially greater challenges posed
by the millions of Syrian migrants seeking protection, the American
experiment, on a smaller scale, may provide a vital testing ground for
confronting the new realities of unconventional refugees in ways that
promote well-being for the migrants themselves, for the nations the
migrants are fleeing, and for the nation in which they seek protection.
The challenges will be with us for many years to come; the need to
develop a new framework must begin now.
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